

CHIRP General Aviation FEEDBACK

Edition 78 | 4/2018

Editorial

In a previous life a young and impressionable Flight Lieutenant Ian Dugmore found himself at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada to take part in Exercise Red Flag. Red Flag is a training exercise designed to simulate as closely as possible the conditions that might be expected during a war. Our hero (me) was there to fly Tornado GR1s on offensive support missions against realistic air and ground threats provided by Red Force. Each exercise evolution involved some 100-150 aircraft launching from Nellis, flying to their start points at opposite ends of the range complex before turning inbound to their targets and creating a giant mixi-blob or 'furball' of defensive and offensive aircraft (fighters, bombers, defence suppression, electronic warfare et al) of all types - all seeking to complete their part of the mission without being targeted by fighters, SAMs or AAA. It was great fun, sometimes eye-wateringly exciting and always very hard work in terms of maintaining Situational Awareness (SA) and safety.

One of the reasons Red Flag worked with acceptable safety margins was because it was meticulously planned and briefed. I well recall a member of the Red Flag staff, a USAF Colonel - straight from central casting, complete with southern drawl and a cheroot - standing up at the conclusion of one mission briefing to say, "Y'all have a good plan. Go and execute the plan!" Now you may have the impression that such a plan limited tactical flexibility, the ability to respond to threats or to support other Blue Air aircraft. Far from it. The planning took account of airspace constraints and sanctuaries such that the options for adjusting routes, timings, altitudes etc. had been thought through in advance and were available when they were required. Planning included a communication plan, with frequencies to be used and what to do in the event of jamming or equipment failure. Fuel planning was a critical item as the use of afterburner would use up fuel at a rate that could and did catch people out. A good plan takes all these factors into account.

But what would happen if, despite all the planning and pre-flight briefings, the situation in

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the air began to get too difficult or out of hand? Well anyone could call a 'knock it off'. Anyone, from the most senior to the most junior participant in the air or on the ground, anyone who felt uncomfortable with the situation could stop the whole 'war' simply by calling it on the RT. No questions asked at the time and you weren't considered a 'wuss'. All aircraft immediately ceased manoeuvring, recovered to base and all crews attended the debrief where appropriate lessons were identified and applied the next day.

So what does this have to do with General Aviation in the UK? Well, consider how often incidents reported to CHIRP are related to pre-flight planning and a breakdown in SA? Quite a few - and 3 in this edition of FEEDBACK. Thorough planning is vital throughout the year and never more so than in the winter when the weather can be a factor. Does your plan include routing and altitude options with fuel considerations? Which ATC services are available and suitable for the weather conditions and do you have the appropriate RT frequencies? Are you sufficiently familiar with your tablet/smartphone and Apps that you can navigate the menus like a teenager? And if, despite all your planning, things begin to get out

of hand, are you mentally prepared to call your own 'knock it off' and go home or divert. It's the professional thing to do and you won't be considered a wuss. It is also entirely professional to use resources such as ATC and the Distress & Diversion (D&D) Cell to assist you - it's what they are there for.

And finally, something to bear in mind before you take off. Although not formally reported through CHIRP we have become aware of a recent incident where a light aircraft was lifted, moved 10 metres and significantly damaged whilst holding as number 2 for take-off behind a four engine transport aircraft. The transport aircraft had been "running up" prior to take-off. Worth bearing in mind that turbulence behind a large aircraft is not necessarily an airborne phenomenon.

Ian Dugmore - Chief Executive

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COMMENT ON FEEDBACK EDITION 77 - RESTRICTED MICROLIGHT INSTRUCTORS

An article in CHIRP issue 76 may have given the misleading impression to some Microlight instructors that the supervising FI does not have to be present on an airfield when a FI(R) is conducting training. The report said;

"If the instructor is still 'restricted', the supervising instructor does not have to remain on the ground; again, while it may be practical for solo circuit exercises, for solo cross country exercises the supervising instructor may consider it safe to fly provided he/she is contactable and can be present at the training organisation within a reasonable time to respond to any issues arising."

However the CHIRP article was referring to GA schools (RTOs and DTOs) operating under EASA Regulation FCL.910.F1

Microlight operations are not covered by this regulation. Microlights operate under the ANO 2016 as amended 2017, (CAP393) page 197 which says:

Flight instructor's certificate (restricted) (microlight)

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), a flight instructor's certificate (restricted) (microlight) entitles the holder of the licence to give instruction in flying microlight aeroplanes with the same type of control system for which the holder's licence is endorsed with a flight instructor's certificate.

(2) Such instruction must only be given under the supervision of a person present during the take-off and landing at the aerodrome at which the instruction is to begin and end and holding a pilot's licence endorsed with a flight instructor's certificate entitling that person to instruct on a microlight aeroplane with the same type of control system on which instruction is being given.

(3) A flight instructor's certificate (restricted) (microlight) does not entitle the holder of the licence to authorise the person undergoing instruction to perform a first solo flight or first solo cross-country flight

CHIRP Comment: We are pleased to publish the correction above and apologise for any confusion we may have caused for microlight instructors.

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COMMENT ON FEEDBACK EDITION 77 - COMMENT No4 - RADIOS AND PERSONAL IMPROVEMENT

Report Text: I'm a recently qualified PPL (A), and I have two short notes if they are useful. If not, no problem, and please keep up the great work!

(1) Recently I was inbound to an 8.33 kHz migrated airfield, however I was unable to dial up the frequency on my club PA28's [radio], which is 8.33 kHz capable. This resulted in some non-ideal too-much-head-in-the-cockpit circling outside of ATZ, and I almost turned back, as I figured out -- not being sufficiently familiar with the [radio] -- where the settings were, to find that someone had fiddled with them to confine the radio to 25kHz spacing. It was a good reminder, especially with shared aircraft, to know your equipment (read the fine print manual!), and to have exercised some of that (i.e. at least the settings), and to include in pre-flight checks.

(2) As a new PPL (A), I keep a set of A5 sheets in my kneeboard, including LARS map, UK wide radio frequencies, etc. I also have some of my own hand-rolled cheat sheets (i.e. aeroplane performance settings, general handling techniques and reminders, etc). My favourite cheat sheet is a list of things I didn't do well and need to improve on: I read it before each flight, and if necessary, add to it after.

CHIRP Comment: Many aircraft radios have the facility to switch between 25 kHz and 8.33 kHz channel separation although it is often an option deep in the menus and impractical to change the selection in flight. CHIRP has some sympathy with the reporter because it is

puzzling that anyone would wish to select 25 kHz channels at this stage of the changeover to 8.33 kHz. That said, the reporter is correct to point out the necessity of being familiar with equipment and test it as far as possible before flight. The reporter's personalised pre-flight preparation and self-criticism outlined in his second comment are laudatory.

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LANDING WITHOUT A CLEARANCE

Report Text: On return from another airfield after a normal VFR instructional/refresher flight, we re-joined the circuit at our base airfield following the established pattern. Having been sequenced "number one" by Air Traffic Control, we were instructed to "report final". Following the turn to final, the Pilot Flying initiated a descent rate in excess of 1,500fpm, and having noticed and de-briefed a similar "dive-and-drive" approach on the outward flight, I was concentrating on coaching the pilot to correct this unstable approach. In so doing, neither the Pilot Flying nor I made the "final" call to ATC, and thus no clearance to land was issued.

I was aware that a helicopter had been cleared to cross the runway ahead of us. I had that traffic in sight, and by the point of touchdown, it was over 150m beyond the runway in use, thus the runway was clear and the landing itself was uneventful.

After landing, Air Traffic called us for a radio check, and it was at this point that I realised we had never actually been cleared to land.

Lessons Learned:

1. As instructor it is important to concentrate on ALL aspects of a safe flight, and not allow an instructional point to dominate at the expense of good airmanship or compliance with ATC instructions.
2. I shall be adding "clearance received (or not required)" to my mental Reds/Greens/Blues 300' final check.
3. Even with an otherwise competent qualified pilot, final approach is not the place to be actively coaching/instructing - delay the instruction until the post-flight de-brief (if safe to do so), call for a go-around and instruct at a safe altitude, or take control of the aircraft.

CHIRP Comment: It is often necessary to instruct or intervene on the final approach where the workload and need for concentration are at their highest. Instructors need to be aware that instructing takes mental capacity that would otherwise be available for maintaining Situational Awareness and avoiding errors. Pre-landing checks and RT calls should be

made at the appropriate times but a 'last chance' check on short final is a good idea. Mnemonics appropriate to the aircraft type can be helpful for all manner of checks; instructors on complex aircraft frequently use "Red (Mixture), Blue (Propellers) Green (Undercarriage), Cleared to Land" as a 'have I done everything?' check on short final.

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WHAT HEIGHT WERE YOU?

Report Text: During a X-country, we [2 * ultralights] flew between [] and [].

I looked to my right expecting to see [my colleague], and made the call, "Where are you [name of colleague]?" The response, "at 7.1" took me by surprise.

It was a hot day with lots of turbulence and VERY poor long-range visibility, so the workload was high. At our final destination we hangered our aircraft and I was exhausted.

At home that night I e-mailed [my colleague] with a copy of the chart and a question, "What height were you?"

Next day at the pilots' lounge full of people, I remembered the e-mail, and asked if [my colleague] had received it?

"Yes."

"What did you think?"

"Nothing showed up on my iPad", he said.

Did you realise you were in Class A airspace and could have killed some 250 people?

His face went white.

CHIRP Comment: Some 30% of airspace infringements occur in the vertical sense and flight planning must include investigating the useable airspace above the route. Although flight planning Apps have great utility, plotting a route on a paper chart is particularly helpful in assimilating a mental picture of CAS above a planned track. In the air, tablet and smartphone Apps can provide invaluable alerts to prevent infringements if the modes and settings are correctly used. When planning to fly in a formation a pre-flight briefing is essential; it should include as a minimum communications, contingencies and options. In this occurrence a call on the RT before climbing could have prevented the subsequent embarrassment.

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FLIGHT SHARING WEBSITE DANGERS

Report Text: I have had cause to discipline a number of flying club members who have been using flight sharing web sites to advertise cost sharing flights. Despite only just passing their

PPLs, they have seen this as an opportunity to 'hours build' at minimum cost.

Instead of steadily building experience and knowledge through their initial flying days, they were acting as pseudo single pilot air taxi operations. Although I accept the current regulations permit this activity, its continued growth across UK GA gives me grave concerns. A quick scan of the site and flights on offer raises the hairs on my experienced Examiner/CFI neck!

Issues:

- Inexperienced pilots (often only around 100hrs) are offering complex flights, with multiple unknown passengers and the risk of distraction and 'press-on-it-is' is very high.
- It is clear that the 'passengers' (many often are minors) are generally unaware of the private and unregulated nature of the flights and level of risk involved.
- Flying clubs are having pilots expose third parties to airside and airborne risks with little knowledge of what their business is being exposed to; airside personnel access and movement should be controlled and this is just an invitation for strangers to get access airside.
- Some of the flights have dubious ability to meet weight and balance requirements - witness the number of flights being offered as pilot + 3 in a PA28.
- We are always being counselled not to expose GA to the obvious risk of smuggling or people trafficking - this just opens up more temptation for illegal activity.

I fear it is only a matter of time before some unsuspecting poor 'passengers' are involved in a serious accident through these schemes. I would be very interested to hear what aircraft insurers view on the matter is as well.

CHIRP Comment: Pilots with appropriate licences are permitted to carry passengers. However, if the risk of their doing so is considered unacceptable, then there is a need to consider whether their training is adequate.

That said, CHIRP has concerns about aspects of cost sharing including the risk of low-hours pilots being pressured into flying in unsuitable conditions. It is also a concern that 3rd parties might be unaware of their pilot's experience level and the risks of flying with low-hours pilots. Fortunately clubs and training organisations can control activity in their aircraft in order to minimise the risks. However, owner-operators and syndicates may not have the experience or authority to do this effectively.

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OBSERVATION OF POOR FLIGHT PLANNING

Report Text: When arriving at a recent fly-in [at an island airfield] we landed behind a PA28 and parked up beside it. Four adults emerged from this aircraft, three average-sized men and one woman, none of whom were wearing a life jacket. When my colleague and I challenged them about this, they said that they had life jackets in the back of the aircraft and they would have put them on in the event of an emergency. The baggage compartment also contained four average-sized overnight bags. The occupants of this aircraft expressed surprise at how busy the airfield was, as they were unaware that a fly-in was taking place. They had a further issue getting to the terminal building as high visibility jackets are required at this airfield and they did not have any with them. We noticed that the aircraft was subsequently refuelled to full tanks. I also observed that the mainwheel tyres were significantly worn, with no tread visible across about half the tyre width.

There seem to have been at least four issues relating to lack of preparation by those flying this aircraft:

1. Weight and balance. The aircraft must have been around 100lb over its MTOW on its return flight.
2. Flight over water without life jackets being worn.
3. Checking NOTAMS. The fly-in was notified in the [airfield] NOTAMS.
4. Checking destination airfield information. A cursory check of any of the flight guides would have revealed that high visibility clothing is required at this airfield.

My colleague and I are not flying instructors, so apart from querying why they were not wearing life jackets, we didn't say or do anything else. Should we have done? If so, how should we have approached it? The phrase 'accident waiting to happen' kept coming to mind after this encounter.

Lessons Learned - The extent to which one should intervene when one sees examples of poor airmanship, particularly for those of us who don't have the 'status' of an Instructor Certificate. How people will react to any such intervention will obviously depend on the individuals concerned, but the potential for conflict probably makes most of us shy away from such an encounter. I would like to think that next time, if there is one, I will be more forthright in voicing my concerns.

CHIRP Comment: There is no easy or standard answer to the question about whether to intervene or not. Not being an instructor is no barrier to helping a fellow pilot but the best-intentioned advice may not be well-received and the situation would need to be judged at the time. It might be possible to raise concerns with the airport officials. Failing that, there is the option of submitting a report retrospectively through the CAA's Whistle-Blower scheme.

CAA advice is that if flying in a twin-engine aircraft, life jackets may be carried until required. However, lifejackets should always be donned before a flight over water in a single-engine aircraft, rather than simply carried on board. In the event of an emergency there would be little time available to retrieve a lifejacket and put it on; furthermore, in a cramped cabin and in a hurry there would be a serious risk of inadvertently inflating the jacket prematurely, making it extremely difficult to vacate the aircraft when the time came.

For more advice see [Safety Sense Leaflet 21: Ditching](#)

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UNSAFE CLEARANCE

Report Text: I had diverted into [an airfield in Belgium] on diversion from my intended destination which was Calais. On start-up for my departure I was given a clearance to climb to 1000 feet in line with the runway. At the hold I asked for a right-hand turn out, on track for my destination. This seemed to annoy the controller, who spoke to me as one might to a naughty child. I cannot recall the words exactly but it was something like, 'what clearance did I give you? You will climb ahead to 1000 feet.' Incorrectly, I understood this to mean climb to 1000 feet before turning.

After take-off my expectation was to be told to change frequency to [] Approach when I would have requested climb to 2000 feet en-route to my nearby destination, where the overhead join would be above 1800 feet. The Minimum Safe Altitude for the leg was 1600 feet.

At 1000 feet I did turn onto track for Ursel and was about to ask for a change to [] Approach when the Tower controller asked my level and I reported 1600 feet. He told me to descend to 1000 feet and I acknowledged and complied immediately.

I immediately recognised that I had misunderstood the clearance and apologised for the misunderstanding. However, by now the Tower controller sounded quite annoyed and told me that it was not a misunderstanding and that I would be reported, and then did not speak

to me again. However, my navigation equipment was warning of a high obstruction and that 1000 feet was not safe. I called Tower again and asked for further climb and he instructed me to contact [] Approach which I did immediately. [] Approach authorised climb to 2000 feet and I continued to my destination.

Clearly, it was not my intention to fly in contravention of my clearance. The aircraft has a Mode-S transponder and so any compliance failure would be immediately obvious. However, the controller thought it appropriate to contradict my acknowledgement of an admitted misunderstanding, with the obvious implication that the compliance failure was deliberate. Frankly I was surprised to hear this assertion and the way in which it was expressed.

Lessons Learned - Single-pilot operation of a light aircraft always requires division of attention between various demands, especially so on a day with strong and gusty crosswinds, on an unfamiliar airfield. However, finite attentional capacity does sometimes mean that we fail to fully or accurately process information even though we try to attend to it. These are just the kinds of situation where a supportive air traffic controller can help to keep everyone safe by alerting pilots quickly and helpfully if any divergence from the correct flight path becomes evident. Where important limitations form part of a clearance it is also very helpful to have them re-enforced, for example by saying something like, 'initial climb restriction, not above 1000 feet without further clearance' on each occasion when instructions are given.

I could have helped myself by not assuming that the height given referred only to maintaining the runway heading, even though the MSA was 1600 feet. I should have asked for clarification about when I would be able to climb above the MSA before take-off. Apart from removing any ambiguity in the clearance, the controller could have helped by not being adversarial and petulant.

CHIRP Comment: The reporter has correctly identified the importance of making himself familiar with the departure procedures in his pre-flight preparations. This is particularly important after a diversion to an unfamiliar airfield and at foreign airfields where controllers might be more difficult to understand than at home. The clearance issued to the reporter was open ended and begged the question "then what?" The reporter is correct that in these circumstances (and any other where a clearance is ambiguous) the right thing to do is ask for clarification. The tower controller may not have had a radar display and therefore been

unable to monitor the aircraft's climb but allowing his irritation to show was unprofessional.

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INADVERTENTLY FLEW BELOW 500FT?

Telephone Report: During a flight from France to the UK the reporter took the opportunity to fly up and down the coast between Clacton and Walton on the Naze. The reporter called Southend then Clacton and used the QNH provided as his reference on 2 altimeters. He flew at 500ft QNH about 50-100 yards out to sea parallel with the beach.

On subsequently checking his route on a flight planning App he was surprised that it had recorded his altitude during the flight up and down the coast at less than 500ft (approx. 400ft) and was concerned at the discrepancy with the pressure altimeters.

CHIRP Comment: Tablet and smartphone Apps use GPS-derived altitude which can have a tolerance of 20-30 metres in the vertical sense. There are also tolerances in altimeters, pressure settings and as a result of the distance between the aircraft and the source of the QNH. However, in the circumstances described, with the aircraft equipped with 2 altimeters using actual QNHs from relatively close airfields, it seems likely that the pilot was closer to 500ft than the GPS-derived altitude shown on his flight planning App.

The report highlights the importance of making allowances for tolerances when selecting an altitude to fly whether it is close to the surface or, in particular, close to CAS.

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AIRCRAFT FLYING LOW IN A DISPLAY AREA THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF A NOTAM

Report Text: The weather was CAVOK with the wind 180°/15kts. There were no flight safety issues with any of the display items. The NOTAMs worked well with 2 helicopters, one operating pleasure flights in the nearby area contacting me, which provided the opportunity to coordinate and pass on information with good comms and provision of the planned route. A second helicopter was also operating in the area, conducting a survey of local railway lines. He was de-conflicted and fully briefed with good RT comms on the display frequency.

However in between the first display item and second at approximately 1125hrs, a single prop light aircraft (PA28 series) appeared without warning at approx. 500ft from the west and over

the event. (Given the topography he would have been around 650ft) over the event and climbing over the bay, turning left. This was at the same time as the survey helicopter was operating in the area at 600ft. I warned the survey helicopter of the presence of the light aircraft, who initially did not see the aircraft. I gave 3 blind calls on the display frequency and then on Safety Comm for the light aircraft pilot to identify himself, however received no reply. Approximately 5 minutes later the light aircraft made another pass at, what appeared to be a slightly lower height before turning left and climbing. I again warned the survey helicopter, who this time had visual with the aircraft. The light aircraft pilot did not make any call on the published frequency and was operating below SERA minimum in an area that was subject to NOTAM for the Air Display. It occurred with 20 minutes until the arrival of the Blades aerobatics team, who would have been completing a CRA from the same point at a similar height.

It is unknown if the light aircraft pilot had checked the NOTAMs for the day, or what he was doing over the town and event. Ten minutes earlier there had been a high energy display, which the aircraft would have flown directly through. In addition, the consideration also has to be given for terrorism and security aspects, with a crowded place, particularly linked to an Armed Forces Event.

Lessons Learned - All mitigations for this sort of occurrence had been met in terms of Display Regulations and practical methods of reducing risks.

CHIRP Comment: Not all flying displays justify the establishment of a RA (T) that would exclude non-display aircraft. Others are simply promulgated by NOTAM with the inclusion of a frequency to contact the Flying Display Director (FDD). It is unknown if the pilot of the light aircraft was aware of the display NOTAM or simply ignored it. Flying through the display area without contacting the FDD was an example of poor pre-flight planning or poor airmanship that could have ended very badly.

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JOINING PROCEDURE CHANGES REDUCING SEPARATION

Report Summary: A reporter has expressed concerns about the trial taking place at White Waltham airfield in which the altitude for aircraft joining the circuit has been reduced from 1300ft QFE to 1200ft QFE. This means that joining traffic is only 400ft above traffic established in the circuit at 800ft.

CHIRP Comment: The trial is being conducted during the period 1 August 2018 to 31 January 2019 with the aim of reducing the number of infringements of the Heathrow CTR by White Waltham traffic. Although White Waltham has an ATZ, the Local Flying Area (LFA) extends to only 1500 ft. amsl in that portion of the ATZ which lies within the London CTR. With an aerodrome altitude of 127 feet, aircraft joining via the overhead at 1300 feet QFE were just 73 feet below Controlled Airspace (Note: White Waltham publish, on its website and in a VFR Guide, 133 feet). Inevitably there were occurrences in which pilots conducting overhead joins and focussing their attention on looking out for traffic established in the circuit strayed above 1500ft amsl and into Controlled Airspace.

When an infringement of Controlled Airspace occurs, the Controlled Airspace Infringement Tool (CAIT) alert is triggered and controllers have no option but to provide 3000ft or 3nm separation between traffic they are controlling and the infringing aircraft. Even a momentary infringement can cause distraction for controllers and disruption to the flow of Heathrow traffic, particularly when the airport is using the easterly runways.

From the GA perspective, reduced separation between joining traffic and established circuit traffic is unwelcome and it is a possibility that low-hours pilots might be apprehensive about operating at White Waltham. However, there are other airfields where there is similar or less separation between joining and circuit traffic. For example, Thruxton 400ft and Fair Oaks 300ft. Fair Oaks is similar to White Waltham in that it is located below the London CTR and has a ceiling on its LFA of 1500ft amsl; aircraft join the LFA at 1400ft QNH and fly the circuit at 1100ft QNH.

There is nothing to stop pilots changing to QFE for their landing if they choose to do so but the use of QNH reinforces awareness of the proximity of Controlled Airspace just above at 1500ft.

As part of that trial at White Waltham the CAA agreed to monitor safety reports and NATS agreed to monitor the number of infringements

and CAIT alerts. Investigations into infringements are ongoing but the following statistical evidence has been obtained:

	SECONDARY CAIT ALERTS		MOR Reports/ Reports of Revised O'hd Join being unsafe
	2017	2018	
Aug	85	11	0
Sep	57	12	0
Oct	51	8	0

More information about infringements and the cooperative work that is being done nationally to prevent them can be found on the ASI website at <https://airspacesafety.com/facts-stats-and-incidents/>.

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FISO CONSULTATION

Readers may wish to be aware that the CAA is conducting a review of the training, qualification and licensing of FISOs. It invites comments from stakeholders by 7 December 2018.

Details can be found on the CAA website at <https://consultations.caa.co.uk/future-safety/fiso-training-qualification-licensing-review/>

FOLLOW-UP TO CHIRP REPORT - MULTIPLE LANDING FEES MAY REDUCE SAFETY

A report about landing fees being charged for go-arounds prompted CHIRP to agree that the imposition of a landing fee for an aborted approach could influence the decision to go around or to continue with a less than optimum approach. CHIRP raised the issue with the Airfield Operators Group and, following a recent members meeting, the Group has published advice on its forum that nobody carrying out a go-around on safety grounds should ever be charged a landing fee.

Reports received by CHIRP are accepted in good faith. While every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of editorials, analyses and comments published in FEEDBACK, please remember that CHIRP does not possess any executive authority.

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CHIRP, Centaur House, Ancells Business Park, Ancells Road, Fleet, GU51 2UJ
01252 378947 | reports@chirp.co.uk | www.chirp.co.uk



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