

CHIRP CC FEEDBACK

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CHIRP 5-Year Review – A ‘Call for Comments’

The latest 5-Year Review of ‘Aviation CHIRP’ is underway. To help the Review Committee with its work, we would greatly value views from air traffic controllers, cabin crew, engineers and pilots, whether or not you have ever filed a CHIRP report. Comments are invited on the extent to which CHIRP improves safety for aviation communities in the UK.

Do you know of a safety issue that was raised through CHIRP which would otherwise have remained unknown or would not have had the right prominence?

What does CHIRP provide uniquely or in addition to other safety reporting mechanisms?

What are the benefits of the CHIRP programme, to individual people and to the community as a whole?

Please comment freely, not just in relation to the questions above. You can send an email either to the usual CHIRP address – mail@chirp.co.uk – and it will be forwarded or you can email directly to the Review Committee’s unique address – chirpreview@gmail.com


Please contribute to this Review, as soon as practicable and ideally by the end of October 2014 as the Review has to be completed by mid-December.

Thank you in advance,

Peter Hunt

Review Committee Chairman (Independent)

CHIRP NEWS



Why not download our new CHIRP App for Android, iPhone and iPad?

For Apple products, visit the App Store (search CHIRP safety). For Android visit Google Play Apps (search CHIRP Charitable Trust).

You will then receive notifications each time a new edition of FEEDBACK is published.

Note: You will only receive a notification for the version of FEEDBACK (Air Transport, GA, Cabin Crew etc.) that you last viewed on the App.

UPDATE ON REPORTS

Between May and June 2014, we saw a large increase in reports from cabin crew querying rest periods for a particular route. A high number of these reports were disidentified with the reporters consent and forwarded to the operator and the CAA for comment. The CAA subsequently advised that the assigned inspector had met with the operator and reviewed the rostering of this route. It was confirmed that the rostering of the duty was compliant with the approved FTL scheme.

Despite this, any cabin crew member who experiences or believes that they may be suffering from roster induced fatigue, should continue to submit reports to the company so that rosters can be analysed and investigated as necessary.

INFANT SECURED WITH NON-APPROVED RESTRAINT DEVICE

Report Text: After boarding was completed we found that we had 11 infants onboard but only 10 extension seatbelts. This was below the minimum level stated in the SEP manual, but as the pre-departure check does not involve counting them it wasn't discovered until the door had been closed.

I informed the Captain of the situation. They asked what I proposed to do. I informed them that the cabin crew were checking all stowages for the seatbelts that were missing but if unable to be located, I felt that we would have no choice but to offload a passenger and an infant.

The demo kits were checked but they did not have the 'loop' that the passenger seatbelt goes through. The Captain was informed that no seat belts had been found and in my opinion the demo kit seatbelt was not suitable due to the loop issue. The Captain refused to offload the passenger and insisted that the demo kit be used, with the passenger fastening their seatbelt, wrapping the demo kit belt around their own and then

fastening the infant's belt around it. I refused to do this as I felt it was a potentially dangerous situation and wasn't happy about using a non CAA approved seatbelt in this way. The Captain said that they would assume full responsibility for the situation and so I asked them to go to the passenger and secure the infant themselves - which they did.

Whilst I appreciate that a Captain has the ultimate command of the aircraft and I would never disobey a legal order from them, I was very unhappy about the securing of this infant.

Lessons Learned - Perhaps it should be a requirement for crew to physically count the number of seatbelts in a stowage. Lesson learned....what the Captain says goes even it's against all my SEP training.

CHIRP Comment: This report was passed to the CAA who have provided the following comment:

In this instance cabin crew members correctly reported the event to the commander and recorded the occurrence in the defects log additionally reporting the incident via the company reporting system.

A number of aeroplane parts and spares are required to hold a specific equipment/parts approval and are delivered to the aeroplane operator's maintenance organisation with appropriate approval paperwork.

Supplementary loop belt/child restraint devices (CRD's) are not required to hold an equipment approval unlike some other aeroplane parts. However the supplementary loop belts are deemed to be compliant if they are manufactured with the same materials and techniques as the approved passenger safety belts with which they are being used.

The Commander is ultimately responsible for the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants. An investigation of the report by the operator should determine the root cause and the operator should address to avoid reoccurrence. This may include a revision to procedures or an increase in the number of CRD's carried.

In the EU, loop belts are not mandatory on aircraft but each infant is required to be secured in/by a CRD, if not a loop belt, a car seat. As they are not mandatory, they may not be subject to an operator specific pre-flight check.

FIRE HAZARD

Report Text: When boarding the aircraft, we were told by the cabin crew disembarking that the bin lid in the rear toilet was missing. The SCCM had noted it in the tech log but it had been in the tech log for a while. There was a sign on the door saying 'toilet out of use' but I believe the toilet had been used when the flight was full.

We made the decision not to use the toilet throughout the flight and kept the toilet door closed even though on both flights we had over 100 passengers.

Throughout fire training, we are told to make sure that toilet bin lids are kept shut as if left open this would present a fire hazard. This aircraft has been flying a while without a bin lid. This is not professional.

CHIRP Comment: Aeroplane certification specifications require all waste receptacles to be fully enclosed to contain a fire should it occur. Missing, unserviceable or misaligned access flaps reduce the fire containment potential and in the case of toilet waste bins allow the escape of the automatic extinguishant.

The cabin crew members acted correctly by reporting the defect and maintenance determined that the toilet should not be used. In instances where the MEL provisions permit despatch of an aircraft with either the bin sealed off or the toilet locked and unusable, it is important that these limitations are observed by all crew members.

INOPERATIVE FORWARD ATTENDANT PANEL

Report Text: The aircraft had arrived into base from its previous sector with the Forward Attendant Panel not working. This meant that the cabin crew had no access to information regarding toilets, door modes, temperature in the cabin or lighting. The test of the evacuation alarm; which would normally take place on the first flight of the day, could not take place due to the lack of FAP. The rear attendant panel of this aircraft has no command switch, and therefore it was not possible to initiate an evacuation from the cabin.

This was deemed as acceptable by the flight crew, but not by the cabin crew. We were unable to dim the forward entry for take-off or landing or send a cabin secure message in the standard format.

During the flight, the cabin became hot, and aware that we could not control the temperature ourselves, we contacted the flight crew. They admitted that they could not control it either, as the air-conditioning system was not working correctly. On the return sector, the cabin crew began to feel the effects of hypoxia, suffering with headaches and feeling light headed. The standard operating procedures could not be followed as a result of this fault, and the crew felt uneasy regarding the procedures used in this incident, as they were not laid down in company procedure.

Lessons Learned: I would suggest that less emphasis be placed on departure on time at any cost. As a crew we felt pressured into leaving on time even though we were unhappy at the number of faults with the aircraft, particularly the inability to initiate an evacuation from any part of the cabin.

CHIRP Comment: Where defects are identified prior to dispatch or during flight operations, cabin crew should inform the SCCM and Captain immediately. The flight crew will be able to verify if the defect has been entered into the aircraft technical log and is awaiting maintenance action - often referred to as a deferred defect.

Dispatch and repair guidelines for aircraft equipment are usually detailed in the aircraft's Minimum Equipment List (MEL), a copy of which is carried in the flight deck in either paper or electronic format. Flight crew and maintenance staff will review the MEL to determine whether an aeroplane can be dispatched and under what circumstances/provisions this is allowed.

This may require the establishment of alternative procedures, an example of this would be an alternative method for initiating an emergency evacuation similar to procedures established by operators that do not have evacuation alarms fitted to their fleet or required to be used in the event of aeroplane system failure.

SAFETY OF PASSENGERS AND CREW COMPROMISED

Report Text: We were told by the Captain that our aircraft was delayed due to fog. The estimated delay was 2 hours so the departure was set to 10.00 am local.

The Captain and SCCM decided that whilst we were waiting on the ground that a full hot breakfast service was to be delivered to our passengers.

Approximately 45 minutes into the service, the aircraft pushed back and the SCCM made the announcement for crew to prepare doors for departure and the safety demonstration. At this stage all crew were out on their trolleys delivering a full hot meal service and were expected to leave their trolleys unattended to prepare the doors for departure. We brought our concerns to the SCCM that we were in no stage of securing the cabin as most passengers were still eating their breakfast. The SCCM said that we had to depart an hour earlier than we were told originally. We had to collect all the trays as the aircraft was moving which wasn't safe for either the crew or passengers.

In my opinion this decision seriously compromised the safety of the passengers and crew and a meal service should never have taken place under these circumstances

CHIRP Comment: Delays happen and slot/departure times are allocated to aircraft during low visibility procedures however the crew members should be aware that slot/departure times are subject to change. In this instance the Captain and the SCCM should have liaised and the aircraft taxi stopped until the cabin could be secured and carts stowed safely. Crew and passenger safety should always be the priority.

POSSIBLE OVEN FIRE

Report Text: After take-off when released from my jumpseat, I put two ovens on to warm them before putting the food in to cook. After approximately 5 minutes warming (without any food inside) there was a strong smell of smoke. I switched off the oven and

cracked the door open and thick black smoke came out. I quickly closed the door, informed the SCCM, got a BCF and gave a short burst and closed the door again. I couldn't see any flames but the smoke was so thick I couldn't see anything in the oven so there may have been. I switched off the electrics and the SCCM informed the Captain. The oven was monitored for the rest of the flight with a crew member always in the galley.

My concern was that the flight crew were not concerned. We continued to our destination and back to base without an engineer or flight crew (on the ground) checking it.

CHIRP Comment: Oven fires are often attributed to malfunction, cleanliness, overloading, or heating of inappropriate items which can result in a smoke/fire event. An in-flight fire is one of the most serious situations a cabin crew member can be faced with. It is therefore essential that crew members work together to deal with the situation as quickly as possible. Effective communication and coordination between cabin crew members and the flight crew is necessary to ensure that the fire/suspected fire is promptly dealt with/extinguished.

In this instance the cabin crew member correctly reported the event to the SCCM and the commander. The correct action was taken with the situation contained as quickly as possible meaning that the flight could continue until the return to base without the oven being used.

Emergency procedures and drills are established by Operators to provide a framework for crew members to work with. The frequency of such events can be reduced by observing standard operating procedures which may include good housekeeping principals such as a pre-flight check of ovens and equipment and regular cleaning. It is important to report defects as well as cleanliness via established company reporting channels/defect recording processes.

Contact Us

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Manager

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FEEDBACK via email...

If you would like to receive a copy of Cabin Crew FEEDBACK via email, please contact us at mail@chirp.co.uk advising us of your name, occupation and preferred email address.

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CHIRP

CABIN CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Airline

Name:	<input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields
Address:	
Post Code:	Tel:
e-mail:	

- Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.
- On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.
NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT
- CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.

It is CHIRP policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response, if required. If you do not require a response please tick the box:

No. I do not require a response from CHIRP

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION		THE FLIGHT/EVENT		CABIN ACTIVITY	
SCCM	<input type="checkbox"/> CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF INCIDENT		BOARDING	<input type="checkbox"/> INFLIGHT SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/>
SUPERNUMERARY	<input type="checkbox"/>	TIME	LOCAL/GMT	DISEMBARKING	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
OTHER:		AIRCRAFT LOCATION		FLIGHT PHASE	
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION		THE AIRCRAFT		PRE-DEPARTURE	<input type="checkbox"/> TAXI <input type="checkbox"/>
TOTAL YEARS	YEARS WITH CURRENT AIRLINE	TYPE/SERIES		TAKE-OFF/CLIMB	<input type="checkbox"/> DESCENT/LANDING <input type="checkbox"/>
CURRENT AIRCRAFT TYPES QUALIFIED ON:		NUMBER OF CABIN CREW		STAND/GATE ARRIVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
1.	2.	NUMBER OF PAX ON BOARD		TYPE OF OPERATION	
PASSENGER(S)/INJURY(IES)		NUMBER OF EXITS		SCHEDULED	<input type="checkbox"/> CHARTER <input type="checkbox"/>
PASSENGER(S) INVOLVED?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	WEATHER (IF RELEVANT)		CORPORATE	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
INJURY TO PASSENGER	<input type="checkbox"/> INJURY TO CREW	TURBULENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> THUNDERSTORM <input type="checkbox"/>	MY MAIN POINTS ARE:	
THE COMPANY		OTHER:		A:	
NAME OF COMPANY:		REPORT TOPIC / MY REPORT RELATES TO:		B:	
				C:	

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the CHIRP staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

- Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary



PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO:

FREEPOST (UK Only) RSKS-KSCA-SSAT • The CHIRP Charitable Trust • 26 Hercules Way • Farnborough • GU14 6UU • UK
 Confidential Tel: +44 (0) 1252 378947 or **Freefone (UK only) 0800 772 3243**
 Report forms are also available on the CHIRP website: **www.chirp.co.uk**