



CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN FACTORS
INCIDENT REPORTING PROGRAMME

FEEDBACK

Number 16

April 1988

Hi Tech

No, CHIRP hasn't been acquired by Robert Maxwell, but we do have a new system for producing FEEDBACK. We used to glue it together, and it was extremely messy and uncouth. It's only about 25 times as difficult to do it on a computer, but our fingers stay clean. Much more professional.

Chirp Update

We haven't been in too much trouble over the past four months - perhaps we're not doing something that we should - and we thought that we might take advantage of this atmosphere of calm to make clear one or two points about how CHIRP works.

Every report that you send us gets a reply. In this we try to say what we think we might be able to do about the report, and we also return the name and address slip. This slip is worth hanging on to, since the CAA has undertaken that if a third party reports you to them for contravening the ANO, but you can demonstrate (with your returned slip) that you reported the misdemeanour to us, then they will not prosecute you (provided it wasn't deliberate, and you weren't too naughty). This immunity was promulgated in an AIC at the start of the scheme, but since its existence isn't widely appreciated, we thought we'd give it a plug.

We will usually discuss the meat of your report with the CAA and the relevant operators to see whether anything can be done to change the equipment or procedure concerned. Frequently this is not possible since many reports address general issues rather than specific items, but these reports are still valuable in highlighting a general problem area. We

feel, for example, that the Notice to AOC Holders included in the last FEEDBACK illustrates how your reports have influenced the CAA's perception of the fatigue problem.

Lastly, all non-ATC reports are sent to the CAA's safety data unit for storage in a disidentified form, though we also store them here at the IAM. We don't send ATC reports to the CAA at the moment because they are difficult to disidentify, and because it is especially important to disidentify them (since the CAA is not just the regulator of ATC but also the employer). We now feel, however, that we have a system for letting the CAA know the effective content of ATC reports without compromising the identity of the reporter, and we believe that it will work well.

In any event, we always take the greatest care to guard the identity of all reporters. This has led some companies to criticise us for failing to let them have enough information to investigate incidents properly. There may well be some truth in this, but what must be remembered is that the alternative to a CHIRP report is not a more detailed report, but no report at all.

Addresses

Every year about a thousand of you tell us that you've moved - thanks, but we still have about 2,000 defunct addresses among the 15,000 on our database. If one of them is yours, please let us know. You might also note that we have a FREEPOST address, but, despite this, about half of your letters carry a stamp. Who says pilots are mean?

Safe flying

WHO SHORTENED THE RUNWAY?


After night flight from LHR to NBO, had poor rest during stopover due to schedule disruption. Discussed departure at D4 rating and set on EPRL. I cross checked EPR for my benefit from manual handed to me by Engineer. We thought we used a lot of runway! The EPRL now read D4B2 and it was from this chart that we had made the calculation. We had set 1.68 and it should have been 1.73 for take off weight close to max. We do not know how the EPRL gauge changed to D4B2, when we had physically set it at D4. I had not checked the power setting at the top of the Take Off Power page in the manual, but had used D4B2! CAUSES:- On leaving LHR the A/C was powered by 3 D4 Eng and 1 C2. Lengthy discussions and no manual indications on whether we could graduate. On leaving NBO positive discussion on use of D4 and lengthy discussions on shortfalls in NBO and also on the multitudinous pitfalls that are possible with all the various engine configurations we are operating. Tiredness due to the difficult rest period available. A sobering experience after many years in and out of Nairobi without incident.

This report is representative of several we have received that involve the aircraft not accelerating properly. It does seem a little strange to us that the take-off safety of all aircraft depends on assumptions about the power produced by the engines, the weight and rolling resistance of the aircraft, the actual wind, density altitude, and so on, yet the only thing that really matters, the aircraft's acceleration, isn't measured at all. Why don't we have a couple of blue lights beside the runway 5000ft from the start of the roll, so that when V speeds are calculated, a blue light speed is also computed? If you haven't got the speed by the lights, you don't go. Is this too easy? Are we too dim? Why are there no blue Smarties?

TIRED = FORGETFUL?

On B737, after engine shutdown on stand, the handling pilot completes the shutdown check items by memory, then calls for the shutdown checks, which are read aloud by the non-handling pilot and the responses given by the handling pilot. On this occasion, as we realised in the taxi to the hotel later, I, as handling pilot, both failed to do the checks or call for them, and the captain failed to notice this omission. Although this in itself presented no danger

it was something neither of us had done before and indicated, we both believed, that we were fatigued rather than tired and led us to wonder what other actions or omissions we had made but failed to notice. The attached roster pattern for this series shows that the flights were planned within the



Bed. Is that all you airline pilots think of?

Courtesy: Daily Telegraph

allowable duty periods, with adequate rest periods, and a conscientious attempt was made to achieve enough sleep, although broken on the last two occasions.

Two points arise from this. Firstly the table used to define the max. allowable duty

period is described as being for crews "acclimatized to local time". In the UK IT environment days off taken at home (often after night flights) are then followed by day flight(s) leading into night flights, with sleep taken in hotels during the daytime with daylight streaming through curtains and the inevitable disturbance caused by the day to day activities of the hotel. Rest taken at home can be worse with the intrusion of family life. How can this be realistically defined as "acclimatized to local time"?

Another potentially more dangerous point was raised by this last flight. A 2 sector FDP starting before 2159 local can last twelve and a quarter hours, between 2200 and 0559 ten and a quarter hours. Both our last two flights exceeded ten and a quarter hours and had to be rostered to start before 2159 hrs. The consequence is that operators use this to schedule flights to the more distant destinations before 2159 and this, on certain days, is causing severe "bunching" over these destinations. On this occasion going into HER, on changing to the Southern Athens control frequency (still no radar, or radar trained controllers) it was obvious that there were a number of aircraft all trying to descend into RHO with transiting traffic at various levels. There was a constant stream of communications between the harassed sounding controller and these aircraft as he requested DME readouts to ensure separation and help his mental picture. We were the third of

three aircraft going into HER, and we were well separated. In brief gaps I asked 5 times for descent clearance without so much as a "standby" in response. When contact was finally made we were cleared straight to F110, and on reaching changed directly to HER approach frequency. It appeared to us that we in the "quieter" area were really responsible via our own mental picture to ensure safe separation. I have great sympathy for the Greek controllers working under considerable strain. but on this occasion very little distraction would have been needed to break his mental picture and a saturation level had been reached where any additional aircraft would have been consciously or subconsciously rejected. I feel there are 2 ways scheduling can be improved to guard against these problems. 1) Not allow any discretion for DP ending say between 0100 GMT 0800 GMT, and/or 2) For a 2 sector day involving any duty between these hours the max FDP should be ten and a quarter hours. The trend within the airlines seems to be scheduling towards the max allowed by CAP371, and individual companies will not agree to a radical change that puts them at a commercial disadvantage. The only solution lies in direct action by the CAA.

We could easily fill FEEDBACK with fatigue-related reports, but we thought that the one above made several points very nicely. The final point is especially interesting in that the CAA told us in FEEDBACK 6 that CAP371 was supposed to represent a "loose fitting framework" within which companies would establish their own detailed arrangements. There is no doubt, though, that commercial pressures on companies are forcing them to work to the maximum. One major company has put it quite openly to its pilots thus; "To remain commercially viable within the industry we must be in as competitive a position as possible. especially in terms of crew ratios. All of our competitors are, or very soon will be, working to CAP 371 limitations. It therefore follows that [this company] needs to move to 371 limits."

Having just received FEEDBACK NO.15 with the CAA's notice to AOC holders headed "FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS" I would make the following comments:- Para 2.1 - Rostering Practices - "a rest period of between 18 and 30 hours should be avoided whenever possible."! On my fleet roster for 4 weeks 13 DEC '87 to 9 JAN '88 has 1428 crew "slips" planned of which 709 are planned between 18

hours and 30 hours (near enough 50%). This has been the norm for a number of years now and is no doubt responsible for a large part of the fatigue problem. Threats of more comprehensive regulations (Para 2.2) are a waste of time - total regulations are the only way to have effective control as any experienced civil pilot will tell you!

Was it Mark Twain who said that everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it? Well, the CAA has agreed to sponsor an IAM study to gather information about what you are rostered to work, what you actually work, when you sleep, how long you sleep, how well you sleep, and how you feel. We're particularly interested to collect these data over the coming summer and we obviously need volunteers. All that you would have to do would be to keep a simple daily log of your work, sleep, and mood. If you're interested in the possibility of helping, please use the form at the back to let us know, and we'll send you the gen. Although it seems to us that it's probably of most importance to gather these logs from IT pilots, we'd be very happy for volunteers from both long-haul and air taxi operations as well. Don't just moan about the weather, keep a log and help do something about it.

RSVP

New angle on old problem - use of local language in ATC comms. Happens regularly since new service started. British a/c and crew operating route for French national carrier. Working Paris. Many calls in French, so don't pay too much attention except to those in English. Both flight crew hardly speak two words of French between them anyway! However, became aware of controller getting agitated as an Air France aircraft would not reply. "Air France Neuf Six Huit maintient niveau de ligne un quatre zero et établis le contact avec Londres un deux sept point un, bonsoir" No reply, then "Neuf Six Huit Paris ...". Slightly more concern with each call. After some little while (90 seconds or more it has to be said) it twigged, and I said "Paris Air France Nine Six Eight if you're calling us would you speak in English please" to which the reply "Neuf Six Huit contact avec ...ah!, pardon monsieur, Nine Six Eight call London One Two Seven One". Good job it wasn't an emergency turn! I should have caught on sooner I suppose, but I'm sorry I just don't speak French - or Spanish, or Italian, or Greek ...

AFTER WHO?

When the F/O contacted the tower, we observed one landing aircraft just in front of us and 2 more aircraft on final approach. To the Tower instruction "After the landing traffic, clear to cross runway 28L", the F/O replied "Roger clear cross 28L" murmuring "Why do we have to cross the runway with such a small separation", we revved up the engines and crossed the runway. After crossing the runway, the F/O asked the tower whether we could continue taxiing down runway 05, and then the tower said "OK, continue taxiing down 05. By the way, we told you to cross the runway after the Airbus 1206 on final landed, didn't you copy that?" This crew, however, could not agree with the tower. "Really?" "They clearly said CLEAR TO CROSS, right?" "I also got it. I had no doubt about it at all" . . . I remember clearly that the tower said "After the landing traffic", and we did what the tower said. . . . Anyway, they, then, clearly said after a pause, "Cleared to cross runway 28L". Exactly, I read back "Roger. Clear cross 28L" but they didn't say anything, right?

Even English-speaking people make such a mistake. . . . There is a problem in the ATC phraseology used. If they would have said "Hold your position", we could have easily understood.

The subject of conditional clearances has figured as a theme in quite a number of your reports. The 28L incident described above, given to us by a foreign operator, highlights the extra difficulty of following comms with ATC if your first language is not English. This seems important to us, so we asked the Directorate of Inspection and Licensing ATS for an authoritative response. They point out that conditional clearances have been discussed by an ICAO Working Group, and by the Air Navigation Commission and comment "It is fair to say that most of the pilot organisations were against the use of

'conditional clearances', conversely most of the ATC organisations and ATC representatives were very much in favour." The discussions concluded that "the use of 'conditional' clearances did assist ATC particularly at busier units. . . . As a result 'conditional' clearances are internationally recognised as a means of expediting traffic movements at busy aerodromes. The CAA Radiotelephony manual, which is closely modelled on the ICAO document, places strong emphasis on the importance of correct identification of the aircraft on which the condition is based. The argument that misunderstandings can have undesirable consequences applies equally to many other air traffic instructions and only serves to underline the importance of the meticulous use of the standard phraseology developed to avoid such misunderstandings."

I agree that waiting for an aircraft to land before a "line-up" clearance is given is the ultimate in safety but at Heathrow there is "safety and expedition" and there is "safety and be here all day". I was the AIR DEP. controller last night between the hours above and there is no way you can sit back and wait for a lander before issuing a line up clearance especially if the departure is a "heavy". He needs to be primed so that he is lined up, on the brakes, as the lander clears, for I have usually got ten or more aircraft waiting for his departure, all asking me what their number is and shall I wait prior to BLOCK 79 or take the extension taxi-way. The other myth is that they think I know exactly where they all are be it at BLOCKS 79, 102, 100, 106, 105 but at night I can assure you the run-up area before 79 is a mass of winking red lights and strobes. Whether it is just departures or a mix of deps/landers it is easier to give conditional clearances so that those whose take-off is imminent can start their remaining engines, do their run-ups in the case of B757s in the cold, and generally jiggle themselves into my order.

ALTITUDE BUST 1

The a/c being flown is the only one in a very large fleet that does not have "full time altitude select". In other words a manual switch selection is required to arm the "alt sel" each time a new altitude is dialled up on the autopilot panel. We were descending in good VMC to level 190 and advised that "slow traffic crossing left to right at FL180". Naturally three pairs of eyes were looking out. The next thing I heard was the altitude warning horn at about the same time as we saw a twin turboprop a/c quite close ahead. I disconnected the autopilot and immediately pulled up to FL190 (from about FL186). ATC noticed and asked if it had given us a fright! Although the a/c is on lease and we do a differences course on it, I feel that there is a good case for the appropriate mod to be done so that all a/c are the same. We were an experienced crew, and we all missed it!

RUSH HOUR PROBLEMS

Approaching ABB (Abbeville VOR) . . . Arrival timed to allow landing at Gatwick immediately following ending of night jet limitations. - Route busy with other aircraft with similar expectations. - French ATC instructions to join ABB hold up to 30mins delay. - Within very short time up to eight a/c had arrived overhead ABB and had been given similar instructions. - French controller overwhelmed and giving instructions for simultaneous descents by more than one a/c at and from similar or adjacent levels. - It is believed that AT LEAST once two a/c crossed levels due differing rates of descent and poor controlling. - The situation developed very rapidly and the French controller was clearly confused and showed no anticipation of the situation. Also clear he had limited experience of controlling holding stacks.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. 1. All crews tired from night flight. 2. Bunching of flights because of night jet movement limitations. 3. A/C holding at different speeds and consequent variations of holding patterns. 4. Intermediate use of French. 5. A/C requesting diversion clearances. 6. No anticipation of situation by French ATC. 7. Poor RT from all concerned. Potential accident risk was considerable for a period of 15mins and reduced because: 1. Conditions mainly VMC. 2. Improved use of R/T eventually with a/c calling leaving, passing and

reaching cleared levels. 3. Change of controller. All the above happened as direct result of failure of London ATC Computer despite denial by CAA of any danger to passengers in evening news broadcast.

Before 0700 Gatwick were using 08L with no ILS and 8/8th cloud at 300ft so no one had landed since before 2300. We were told at LATCC there would be no "Gatwick rush" in the morning as severe restrictions were in force. However by 0635 there were 11 a/c routing to EASTWOOD and more to WILLO. Few of the pilots involved appeared to know that the main runway was closed and fewer still that there was a 300ft cloudbase and no ILS on 08L, and no one had landed for at least 8 hours. By the time the runway finally opened there were at least 19 a/c holding over Southern England at a time when the controllers concerned had been on duty for nearly 8 hours and were all very tired due to awkward sleep patterns before a first night duty. . . . No incident actually occurred but at one stage three a/c were heading for LYD at FL330. It was noticed but more by luck than judgement. Most of the a/c came from outside the European ATFM area but surely there must be some way to stop this rush when pilots and controllers are tired and someone is going to end up holding for about an hour at the end of a long journey.

ALTITUDE BUST 2

A/C A entering the holding pattern over BIG at FL100 making a very wide right turn (strong SW wind). A/C B (also wide body) airborne 09R ex Heathrow quickly reaches 6000ft on Heathrow QNH.....This is the transition altitude. A working Heathrow. B with me. I "borrow" FL90 from Heathrow after correct co-ordination and climb B to FL90..... all r/t pilot and self correct. Aircraft tracks will be very close and B climbing rapidly, so, after "Feeling in the water" give confirming traffic advisory. B pilot replies will maintain FL90 and Fully IMC. Very soon after note B mode "C" at FL95..... I query this..... no reply. Less than 2nms now so I give avoiding action to the left..... no reply and mode "C" at FL97. I receive a garbled acknowledgement at the second attempt and observe B in the turn and descending..... miss distance approx three-quarters of a nm and 200ft vertical. I asked the B pilot what he was doing going through FL90 and he is obviously confused. Some moments later he solves the problem and somewhat shakily apologises..... I was still flying "QNH" i.e. he was climbing to approx FL103. The vertical reference rules are essential but pilots PLEASE BEWARE LOW PRESSURE. Your aircraft climb magnificently, but good cockpit drill for subscale settings must be adhered to. I wonder how often this does occur, but is not noticed due to "normal" pressure levels?

Some of you may have heard the claims that the commonest remark made on the flight deck of a 757 is "Now I wonder why it's doing that?". It's probably truer that the commonest mistake made on any flight deck is the altitude bust - usually because of a forgotten change to the pressure setting. We think that these two busts graphically illustrate their main danger, ie you're liable to bump into someone coming the other way. Definitely best avoided - but you'd probably already realised that.

MISSING DIGITS, WRONG READBACK

..... A short while later I asked A (who was outbound climbing) to report its level and he replied "SEVEN". I asked B (inbound descending) the same question and he replied that he was passing FL70. (The A reply is a quote, I do not recall the exact words used by B but he clearly indicated passing FL70). On this basis I turned B left onto a base leg for RWY 05 and shortly afterwards asked him his level again which he reported as five thousand five hundred feet (thereby giving me at least 1,000ft vertical separation from A). The Galloway controller then phoned to handover another inbound aircraft and I said that I would give him A as it must now be almost at FL80. Galloway replied that it was showing only 52 on SSR mode C. I asked A to confirm his Flight Level and he replied that he was passing Flight Level 54. Fortunately there was slightly greater than 3 nautical miles between the two aircraft as the B was passing behind A; separation was therefore achieved more by luck than judgement. In retrospect I can only conclude that when A reported his level as "SEVEN" he must in fact have said "FOUR SEVEN" but clipped the start of the transmission. This error could have been avoided if either a) I had confirmed the level of A (which at the time I did not consider was necessary) or b) if Glasgow Approach/Radar was equipped with SSR (which we have been promised again and again but still no sign of it actually happening).

During a British civil aircraft movement, (with a mixed UK/US crew) into the USAF military airfield at Keflavik the QNH was heard as "-986". This was interpreted as 29.86in as the crew expected a QNH in inches and knew that the Americans clip leading numbers i.e. Freq 119.75 is given as 19.75. At low altitude an alert radar operator asked for an altitude check against his mode C read out. Cross checking the QNH gave 986 mb!

Prior to the incident the traffic situation was complex. Runway 06 was in use, but training aircraft were also making NDB approaches to Runway 24. I was delegated to give a foreign registered Falcon 10 a Surveillance Radar Approach to Runway 06. Identification and initial descent were normal, with a slightly extended routing due traffic. The aircraft was positioned on a closing heading, north of the centreline 8 NM from touchdown at 2000 feet QNH. The aircraft was then instructed to descend to

"1500" feet, and given range from touchdown. The readback however was missed due to speech co-ordination between myself, the No.1 Director and the Aerodrome Controller. At five and a half NM from touchdown the aircraft was not painting on the 3cm radar, and simultaneously the aircraft reported VMC below at "500" feet. The aircraft was advised to either maintain good ground contact or climb and adjust to final approach altitude/range checks. Vectors continued until runway sighted at 3 NM from touchdown. A prime reason for this incident was my failure to monitor the readback, mitigated by the poor intercomm facilities. However the pilot should have been aware that it is not normal practice to descend aircraft to 500 feet when 8 NM from touchdown on a surveillance radar approach. The pilot seemed unconcerned about the error and made no comment on the incident.

Some of you may remember that, years ago, a 747 going into Nairobi was cleared to "7, 5, 0. 0" by the controller, but the crew missed the "7", heard "5" with some zeros after it, and believed they had been cleared down to 5,000ft. They read "Roger, cleared to five thousand" back to the controller, but he missed it, and didn't correct them. Since the runway elevation at NBO is 5327ft, the ILS deviation warning light came on (but was ignored because it was unexpected), and the glide slope pointers were out of view in the up position. Nevertheless, the aircraft kept going down, broke cloud at a couple of hundred feet, and missed the ground by not a lot.

It's still happening. The AAIB Bulletin of January '88 describes the accident to the King Air going into Leeds-Bradford: "The controller recleared the aircraft to descend to 3000ft on the QNH of 1008. This clearance the commander did read back to the controller, but incorrectly, as 'Three thousand feet on 998'. This was not noticed by the controller."

The aircraft collided with high ground short of the runway, killing the pilot.

Everything in FEEDBACK in italics is, as nearly as possible, in the reporter's own words.

ROTARY COLUMN

During a shuttle flight between the Claymore platform and accommodation rig, we landed for refuel on Claymore just on darkness, and were there some 20 minutes while we refuelled. I remained at the controls while P2 got out to supervise refuelling. We were parked into wind; the large flare was some 20 degrees to port, and an intense sodium light some 30 degrees to starboard. On departure, as we cleared the installation, we were confronted with the utter blackness of a dark sea. However, for nearly a full minute, all I could perceive was the image of the flare, that continued to appear to burn before my eyes. I had NO effective external vision, and experienced great difficulty in seeing my instruments (impossible to see them at first, gradually improving with time up to about 2/3 minutes before I had good vision). Fortunately it was the co-pilot's handling leg. From talking to other crews, I believe this problem occurs to some extent quite frequently on night flights to platforms with large gas flares. I have also heard a suggestion that the flickering nature of the flare across cockpit, reflecting off windscreens and rotor blades, etc can be disorientating; although I personally have not experienced this.

Airborne from Fulmar climbed to FL45 working AUK LOG for a flight watch to 113R 90 DME ADN. Sector frequency is 123.55 so I made a blind call before joining the 113R at 140 DME and monitored 123.55 for any other traffic joining the 113R and who may not be using A UK LOG as a flight watch. I am particularly aware of the possible confliction having had an incident myself when on the 116/113R working AUK LOG and other traffic working 123.55. At 90 DME on calling Aberdeen offshore I was advised that I was immediately above a helicopter at 2500 QNH. Despite having monitored 123.55 I had missed this traffic lifting a rig to join the 113R and he had not used AUK LOG for a flight watch and had joined the radial after my blind call. Hence he was not aware of my presence. This type of frequency split and negative reporting system is not only dangerous but relies wholly on human nature to ensure an accident is avoided.

There are a lot of CHIRP reports out there just waiting to be written down. Go on, write yours down. No report? Why not volunteer for the sleep study outlined on p3? Tick the box on the form (overleaf) and fill in your name and address. It's all FREE.

PRIDE BEFORE A FALL

Approach proceeded normally with simultaneous interception of LOC and GS at approx 8nm from touchdown. The autopilot pitched down quite violently at GS capture and I disconnected it. On the ILS the a/c was reluctant to lose speed and I deliberately flew above the GS to reduce speed to enable more flap to be selected (gear already down). Thereafter the approach became very ragged and I never became stabilised on the ILS, the situation made worse by a crosswind (and maybe tailwind/updraught). When we eventually became fully visual at approx 300ft AGL the a/c was displaced to the right of the centre-line (x-wind from right - I had over-corrected) and also above VASI glideslope with speed in excess of V ref + 20kt. I was able to complete the approach and landing, touching down a little beyond the 1000ft point at higher than normal speed. In retrospect I consider that my airmanship and judgement were very poor, because: (a) I should have abandoned the approach when it became clear I was not going to get stabilised on the ILS. (b) Even after becoming visual I should not have continued to landing at excessive speed on a shortish, wet runway. (c) My F/O was very new to the a/c (I was line-training him) and therefore was less likely to call out displacements of flight path and speed. I don't know why my airmanship was so bad on this approach. I did consider a go-around both before and after becoming visual, but did not carry it out (too proud to admit mistake to new F/O?).

WHAT COMES IN (Total since Dec - 124)

Flight Deck crew	
Fatigue/Commercial pressure	36
Own errors	13
Tech problems	6
Crew co-ordination	2
R/T or ATC related	16
Misc	7
Controllers	
Separation erosion	16
Equipment	2
Management	2
Staffing/workload	4
R/T	5
Own errors	7
Local control	7
M i s c	1

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WILL BE KEPT

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 ADDRESS.....

 PHONE No.....

DATE OF RECEIPT AT THE R.A.F. INSTITUTE OF AVIATION MEDICINE

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 ENABLE US TO CONTACT YOU IF WE ARE NOT CLEAR
 ABOUT ANY PART OF YOUR ACCOUNT.

IN ANY EVENT THIS PART OF THE FORM WILL BE
 RETURNED TO YOU, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TO
 CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR REPORT.

YOURSELF	THE FLIGHT	THE INCIDENT
CREW POSITION	DATE	TIME (PLEASE STATE LOCAL/GMT)
TOTAL FLYING HOURS	FROM :-	DAY/NIGHT
HOURS ON TYPE	TO :-	LOCATION
THE AIRCRAFT	IFR/VFR	PHASE OF FLIGHT
TYPE	TYPE OF OPERATION	WEATHER (IMC/VMC)
No. OF CREW		

PLEASE USE THIS SPACE TO WRITE YOUR ACCOUNT, USING EXTRA PAPER IF YOU NEED TO

*** Please tick here if you would like details of the sleep study and complete the name and address sections above. ***

SEND TO: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS, FREEPOST, RAF IAM, FARNBOROUGH, HANTS. GU14 6BR
 YOU CAN ALSO OBTAIN MORE DETAILS BY TELEPHONING ALDERSHOT (0252) 24461 EXT 4375