EDITORIAL

Is there a systemic problem with aviation? Fatigue reporting, 7-day rosters, controlled rest, aggressive responses when calling-in unfit to fly, fatigue classified as illness, absence management policies, called before standby starts, roster instability, overtime, Commander’s Discretion, leave cancellation, lack of nutrition opportunities. Long haul, short haul, touring operations, offshore helicopter operations, Ops and Crewing staff are all affected. Airspace and airports are congested and there are shortages of suitably qualified and experienced ATCOs and engineers. In fact almost anywhere one looks there is evidence of the last drop of output being squeezed from the available resources. At what point do reasonable operational and commercial imperatives become unreasonable and unsustainable pressures on flight crew, cabin crew, controllers and engineers?

Have we reached that point right now? While there is undoubtedly good practice in places, often it appears that safety management mechanisms are overly dependent on reacting to reports and occurrences. Without proactive measures to ensure balance, an evidence-based or data-driven approach to safety could mean that pressure is applied and increased far beyond the point where a holistic policy would require changes to moderate the pressure.

Nowhere has this become more evident than in rostering and fatigue under EASA FTLs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of controlled rest is increasing; why is this? Flight crew have learned how to manage their rest but stop-overs scheduled for 18-36 hours are widely recognised to be the most difficult, particularly when followed by a long flight home. Rosters are constructed with multiple short sectors, limited opportunities for nutrition, minimum rest, and late/early transitions. It can be done but is it conducive to safely or health? Unfortunately there are often financial and procedural disincentives to reporting unfit through fatigue or illness, including the reclassification of fatigue as illness and the application of the Bradford Index – widely considered to be inappropriate for managing flight crew absence from work. Another potential factor is overtime work, which can be attractive, particularly for younger pilots paying off training expenses, but are recently-qualified pilots good judges about how far to push themselves?
Reports received by CHIRP routinely state that operators respond to predictive challenges to rosters and fatigue reports by saying that the rosters are ‘legal’. This indicates that more emphasis is being placed on complying with the numerical limits of EASA FTLs than meeting the obligation to “ensure that flight duty periods are planned in a way that enables crew members to remain sufficiently free from fatigue so that they can operate to a satisfactory level of safety under all circumstances”.

What can we do? Keep reporting safety-related issues! Whenever possible report to your employer but if that is difficult for some reason, or the response is considered inadequate, then submit a CHIRP report. I know I sound like a stuck record (vinyl!) but the only lever the producer has is to be conscientious about submitting reports. The onus is then on the employer to provide some form of response. The response is a vital element of any safety management system and in this regard we urge operators, ANSPs and engineering organisations to redouble their efforts to feed back to the front line the lessons learned and changes resulting from reports that have been submitted. In an evidence-based system the importance of feedback to reporters by their employers cannot be overstated.

Ian Dugmore - Chief Executive

Fatigue: My colleague Ian, has discussed flight crew fatigue at length above - but what about fatigue amongst engineers? The very nature of the engineering and maintenance environment makes it unlikely that an engineer will take himself off a shift because of tiredness or fatigue. There is anecdotal evidence in incident and error investigation reports that engineers – being human – do experience fatigue, particularly those working night shifts. There is also anecdotal evidence that some engineers do not always do enough to ensure adequate rest prior to starting their shift. Whatever the cause, it is unlikely that anything will change in the understanding, recognition and management of fatigue unless engineers are prepared to share their individual experience of it. How do we as a community encourage this change in reporting culture?

On a different subject, CHIRP has received a number of reports where communications were a common theme:

MEL: The aircraft Minimum Equipment List (MEL) provides operators with a degree of “time-bound” relief for some deficiencies in items of aircraft equipment.

Operators have a duty to address these deficiencies in the period specified within the MEL. However, there are occasions where the relief provided within the MEL simply isn’t sufficient to allow the equipment deficiency to be adequately addressed. There is a rigorous process to be applied whereby an operator can extend the MEL relief period (Repair Interval Extension). This RIE privilege is normally authorised through the organisation’s Quality Manager once he/she is satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional and beyond the operators control – it should be noted that this activity is subject to scrutiny by the regulator.

With the RIE in place and the aircraft tech log certified accordingly, the maintenance/continued airworthiness aspects have been fully and correctly addressed. However, that’s not quite the end of the story – the aircraft Commander has a further responsibility with respect to the acceptance of the aircraft with an obligation to check and verify the condition of the aircraft and its accompanying documentation.

Where the RIE privilege is invoked it is quite likely the aircraft Commander may not be fully conversant with the RIE “mechanism” and may in some cases query the apparent MEL “overrun.” In this instance it may be useful for the maintenance staff who are fully conversant with the RIE process to spend a moment or two explaining to the flight crew the rationale and legality behind this process. Companies could perhaps usefully bring the RIE process to the attention of flight crews.

Manufacturers’ working parties: There are occasions where work that is outside of an organisation’s Part 145 scope of approval is required to be performed. CHIRP has received a number of reports in recent months in respect of manufacturer’s working parties, where there were varying levels of misunderstandings/misinterpretations both from engineers and Part 145 organisations in respect of task certification – an activity which invariably involves 2 separate organisations’ approval systems. So let’s have a quick look at the overall process in its broadest terms.

Where a task requirement arises that is outside the scope of the Part 145 organisation’s approval as detailed in the Maintenance Organisation’s Exposition (MOE), the Part 145 organisation can invoke the “manufacturer’s working party” process, also detailed in the MOE.

Before work commences there needs to be a clear demarcation agreement/understanding to determine the scope of the work to be carried out by the manufacturer’s working party, formalised by a recorded “shift handover meeting.” The resulting task “work pack” will normally comprise the “manufacturer’s working party” own documentation together with the Part 145 organisation’s Certificate of Release to Service “top
The “manufacturer working party” will certify for the work performed by them under their own organisational approval and the completed documentation will then be accompanied by either a Manufacturer’s Certificate of Release to Service or a Manufacturer’s EASA Form 1.

On completion of the manufacturers working party work, there needs to be a further formal handover from the working party to the Part 145 organisation to explain in detail exactly what has been done. On receipt of the completed task work pack and accompanying Manufacturer’s Certificate of Release to Service or the Manufacturer’s EASA Form 1, and after the “shift handover” the Part 145 Certification staff will review the manufacturer’s work pack for completion and once satisfied certify the “top sheet” Certificate of Release to Service under their organisation’s Part 145 approval. In this way the responsibilities and accountabilities for both organisations separate Part 145 approvals are fully met in an open, transparent and auditable manner.

For a further example of communication issues, see the report about the closure of an operator’s parts department later in this Edition.

John Dunne - Deputy Director (Engineering)

**COMMENT ON AIR TRANSPORT FEEDBACK EDITION 124**

**Report Text:** I am becoming increasingly disappointed with CHIRP.

The latest issue shows a report from a cabin crew member claiming they believe flight crew are sleeping in the flight deck floor in full bunk kit. The reporter did not see this taking place, but chose to make that their conclusion. The matter can be fairly easily explained by contacting a long haul operator for clarification. Very often, the relief pilot, having finished their spell in the bunk, will remove the bedding, roll it up, and then store it in the corner of the cockpit for use later, during their second, shorter break. This makes it quicker to clear out the bunk, and saves bunk material by not needing fresh bedding to be unsealed later. Sometimes, during Controlled Rest, a pillow is used in the seat, and sometimes, the mattress is used over the chest and abdomen whilst in the seat. The bedding bundle can easily move in turbulence and partially unroll, especially if was initially placed on the sidewall. Pilots in my airline, do not in my experience ever sleep on, or even ask to sleep on the floor. I believe this report to be vexatious, and am disappointed to see CHIRP publish it.

Other reports regarding minimalist walk-rounds, ice and one you reported a while back about cabin crew reporting their pilots for taking off in low visibility, come into the same category, and undermine the integrity of your publication. The walk-round case could well be a pilot who had already completed the walk-round earlier, going out again to cover something he wanted clarifying, or to make another check of ice he had previously seen melting; there could be plenty of other good explanations. The wing ice report also smacks of malice, and without much more corroboration, should not have been published.

I urge the editing of CHIRP, an otherwise excellent publication, to be wiser in its filtering of reports, and to resist supporting other employment groups in a whinge-fest against flight crew.

**CHIRP Response:** We welcome all comments - good and bad – because we aim to serve the readership as well as we possibly can. CHIRP Comments reflect the views of the Air Transport Advisory Board; this comprises some 30 members and includes experienced pilots (short and long-haul, fixed-wing and rotary), ATCOs and licensed engineers. The reports referred to above could have been submitted maliciously. We try to weed out reports that appear to be campaigning, ranting or malicious but for the most part we accept reports in good faith, particularly when there is a good safety lesson or reminder. We also wish to encourage people to submit reports and a good way of doing this is to show people that their reports will be taken seriously even if they turn out to be ill informed.

In light of the remarks above, we could have added some alternative explanations for the reported scenarios and still brought out effectively the safety lessons and encouragement to report. We will certainly bear that in mind in our future editions of Air Transport and Cabin Crew FEEDBACK.

Once again, we are grateful for these comments and urge all readers to challenge us whenever you feel it is appropriate.

**INCREASED RISK LEVELS**

**Report Text:** I'm sitting in [ ] filling out another ASR and have realised, after reading back my description of events, that an ASR doesn't begin to highlight my concern with the current level of risk we are exposing ourselves to.
There is currently a disagreement between our union and the Company. One element of it is that flight crew don't, as a matter of course, acknowledge any roster changes or delays communicated outside contractually obligated contact periods.

For us, flying the Freighter, this no contact has a huge impact on our roster stability. The roster is very fluid, to say the least, and what has become normalised deviancy is to turn up to work at home-base to pick up a long delay. Often this can result in running out of flight duty times at sign-on, or usually just to delay a flight into or further into our WOCL, as most flights are back-of-the-body-clock anyway. We'll leave knock-on effects and parking jets to another day.

So, the plan: unusually, an early evening sign on, one quick sector, all done and in the hotel by 0200 body-clock.

Get to work in time for a leisurely coffee and flight prep to find a 3:30 hr delay due to landing slots at either my destination, or the next. The new take-off time is now at scheduled landing time. The whole plan for home/work/rest is now invalid and I haven’t signed on yet. The delay pushes the flight into WOCL; we won’t now get to the hotel much before 05:00L and the approach will be at 04:00L (and body-clock). Two-man crew, we both had a relatively early start to try to keep some semblance of home/work balance, so a long day. I ask for a hotel room to rest, and mitigate some fatigue, but crewing refuse the request as the delay was deemed too short to qualify i.a.w company procedures.

We sit around dispatch for 3 1/2 hours, decide we feel good enough for the duty, get to the aircraft where we find further delays due to flow control (another 35 mins as it turns out, but originally ATC were talking about another 2-3 hours). OK, we are here, both feeling awake, full of caffeine, FTLs still OK, short flight, happy to continue.

The flight is ‘[ ] standard’, poor comms, wrong levels, more fuel burn, summer weather avoids en route and unforecast arrival weather, and, to top it off, an appalling, high workload feed-in to the ILS. All-in-all another day in the office.

I am a great fan of the old Swiss-Cheese accident model and there are a whole series of holes from this one example, all lining up, and more importantly, becoming the accepted norm. We, as individuals are implementing solutions to mitigate the elevated levels of risk in the operations but we need fundamental changes at the top before a major incident occurs. ‘We could see it happening, it was only a matter of time’ is never an acceptable posture and I feel we have been frogs in warming water for so long, the water is beginning to boil. I have heard there are improvements in the pipeline, but change is notoriously slow in this company. We are the last line of defence, we are at that last line, there are holes in that last line.....

**CHIRP Comment:** The Operator confirmed that it was aware of the fatigue issue and had several initiatives to address it, including a new crew management programme, new rostering software and a fully integrated FRMS. The operator agreed with the reporter’s analysis that the disagreement between itself and the Union resulted in crew members not checking changes to flight schedules, delays and duty times before coming to work and, as such, crews were not aware if there was a significant change to a duty. This resulted in unnecessary early reports when crew members could be at home resting rather than waiting at an airport or in dispatch. This was not the only reason for roster disruption but contributed significantly.

From the CHIRP perspective it is clear that there are safety implications associated with this dispute. All involved are urged to do their utmost to resolve it urgently.

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**USE OF COMMANDER’S DISCRETION**

**Report Text:** I have a question regarding your lawyer’s interpretation of the use of Captain’s discretion.

On a 4 sector day, with delays experienced after check in, can we legally depart a crewed base on sector 3 knowing we will have to use discretion to complete sector 4 back to base?

The company’s opinion is that it is legal to use discretion to complete all of the duties as the delays happened after check in.

My opinion is that EASA implies discretion is to be avoided if possible, and we are not doing that by leaving a crewed base knowing we can’t get back without exceeding maximum allowable FDP.

If I have an incident on sector 4 how would a court view the fact that we didn’t change crews when we could have?

Also, we have a particularly long 2 sector day which often requires discretion to finish. Is this monitored and is there a limit (20%, 30%, 50% of the time discretion used) at which the authority would question this duty and insist on some form of variation (day off before/after).
**Operator's Comment:** The Company’s opinion is that it is legal to use discretion to complete all of the duties as the delays happened after check in. The view of the company is that this is legal where it is necessary, but at all times the final decision to exercise discretion rests with the Commander. [The Company] operates with multiple protections that may be utilised by its crew and these include offloading themselves if they decide they are fatigued at any stage during a duty. This is managed by the independent FRMS department, and not line management, ensuring its independence and a no-jeopardy approach. In an example where the pilot is on a 4 sector duty and on sector 3 he/she cannot complete the full 4 sectors within the allowable FDP the company view is that it is ultimately acceptable to have an alternative plan whereby, if necessary, the flight can terminate down route if the Commander is unable to exercise discretion to complete the full 4 sectors.

In the example of “leaving a crewed base knowing we can't get back without exceeding maximum allowable FDP” then the likelihood and extent of any such exceedance will be assessed and a judgement made as to whether a standby crew will be called to undertake the remaining element of the FDP. Should the FDP continue, and all crew members remain fit to operate, the Operations Department is required to have a viable and practical plan that includes the option to end the duty after the 3rd sector, or to implement a diversion and crew change on the 4th, all within the available FDP and thereby not requiring the use of discretion to complete the revised duty. Should the situation change on the 3rd sector or the Commander decide the crew are fit to operate the 4th sector, then that remains the decision of the Commander.

All cases of discretion are recorded and form part of the company FRMS oversight within the SMS. The full details of flight pairings that experience increased levels of discretion use are a standing agenda item within the [fatigue management group] and reported to the CAA [who also have full access to the [fatigue management group] and can attend without formal invite]. As could be expected in [this Company] these flights are given the highest level of focus within the operational departments who review all environmental factors in the aim of reducing levels of discretion. All [our] flights are reviewed in respect to block and realistic turnaround times to ensure the flights are scheduled with sufficient planning buffers to allow their completion within the allowable FDP. Insisting on a day off before or after is an industrial relations matter as [the Company] fully complies with relevant EASA FTL rules and internal mitigations including more restrictive planning limitations.

The FRMS department, which has full regulatory approval to EASA standards, monitors the fatigue risk of all rotations or flights irrespective of whether they generate Commander’s discretion.

**CHIRP Comment:** Flight crew are highly motivated to move their passengers safely and in accordance with the flight schedule. This is the professionalism the industry relies upon. It is a big decision, therefore, to cancel a flight on subjective grounds and in these circumstances there can be few pilots who would not feel the weight of passenger expectation upon them. It is with good reason that EASA FTL (AMC1 ORO.FTL.205(f) Flight Duty Period) includes in its general guidance that “the exercise of Commander’s Discretion should be considered exceptional and should be avoided at home base and/or company hubs where standby or reserve crew members should be available”. The use of the word ‘should’, rather than ‘shall’ indicates that it is not illegal to leave base on sector 3 knowing that discretion will be required to return to base on sector 4. Of note, this operator would prefer Commanders to terminate a duty at an airport in the schedule; others may prefer flights to continue up to the point at which a diversion would be required if the Commander did not use his discretion.

Discretion is a subject regularly reported to CHIRP and, following the implementation of EASA FTLs, reports often reflect flight crew concerns about their vulnerability to legal action in the event of an incident occurring during a flight undertaken using Commander’s Discretion. While this concern is understandable, decisions taken in accordance with the regulations and using all the relevant available information are hard to challenge. Commanders should consider only the safety implications of using discretion rather than concerns about legal action.

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**CLOSURE OF COMPONENTS DEPARTMENT**

**Report Text:** [The Operator] is closing its components department and has lost control of safeguarding procedures in its standards manual to control who repairs and to [which] standards. All now controlled by unregulated warehouses, who send work to their list of suppliers losing a level of control and safety.

**CHIRP Comment:** The Operator has advised that it has exercised care and diligence throughout the change management process to ensure that the existing standards were not prejudiced. Whilst the existing regulations covering component standards are adequate and appropriate, the organisation is reviewing the existing standards to ensure that they reflect current industry best practice. The Part M regulations cover the
requirement for approved supplier lists and the oversight of these lists, whilst the Part 145 regulations cover the acceptance of components. Cumulatively the Part M and Part 145 requirements ensure that, wherever the components come from, there is sufficient demonstrable control to ensure safety is not prejudiced. The Operator intends to transpose the data in its current standards manual into work orders that will be transmitted to the various component workshops in order to maintain the existing control of standards. It should be noted that Operators (under their Part M Approval) control the modification state of components – i.e. what Service Bulletins have been carried out and to ensure all components are fully Airworthiness Directive compliant.

CHIRP recognises and welcomes the reporter’s input as this has highlighted the importance of communications across the Operator’s organisation. Unfortunately, in this case the Operator hadn’t fully communicated the change process across the organisation which allowed some misconceptions to develop. This was perhaps a classic case of the change management process detailed in the Operator’s Safety Management System Manual being fulfilled but not effectively communicated to all stakeholders. Perhaps this could have been considered for inclusion in the organisation’s Part 145 recurrent training programme.

No B1 On Site

Report Text: The first incident concerned a young trainee engineer who was tasked with a complex task on [an aircraft type] with no B1 engineer on site and the only type rated engineer on day off. The lack of supervision resulted in the engineer being struck by part of the landing gear resulting in a 1 inch deep cut above his eye which required a hospital visit.

The second occurrence has not happened yet; hopefully this report will stop an occurrence which will affect flight safety. A [aircraft type] was on a major inspection in the company hangar. During the inspection composite delamination was found in critical areas. There are no composite trained engineers on site. One of the workshop sheet metal workers has been asked to carry out the repairs without first gaining training; this engineer is receiving considerable commercial pressure to do this work over a weekend.

These are only two examples of numerous failings that would take a book to be written.

CHIRP Comment: This report contained 2 distinct elements both relating to manpower control, one that had occurred and the other which had the potential to occur.

1. The first element of this report – leaving a trainee engineer to work alone and unsupervised – isn’t meeting the spirit of intent of training and is perhaps indicative of a failure by the organisation to comply with its Part 145.A.30 (d) approved manpower plan obligations and the Part 145.A.30 (e) competency obligations. Additionally, it is noted that during the course of his unsupervised work the trainee sustained an injury which required a hospital visit; any accident resulting in injury, whether or not it required professional medical treatment, should be recorded by the Company and is subject to review by the Health & Safety Executive (HSE).

2. In the second element the reporter is being proactive by making reference to an engineer being requested to perform a structural repair over a weekend period, for which training had not been given. Part 145.A.30 (e) requires organisations to develop a competency plan for its staff which, when used in conjunction with the approved manpower plan detailed in Part 145.A.30 (d), ensures that the right number of correctly qualified/experienced staff will be available to perform the planned/required maintenance activity.

As the events potentially had both EASA and HSE oversight elements, CHIRP invited the reporter to expand on the points raised within the report but to date we have not received any additional information. The report, without the identity of the reporter or the organisation, has been passed to the CAA.

Negative Airworthiness

Report Text: Pre-installed EFB class 3 has been deactivated and substituted with EFB class 2 with software B including operational manuals containing PDF style QRH.

Hard copies of QRH containing normal, abnormal and emergency checklists were removed from the aircraft. [ ] isn’t a stand-alone application and doesn’t qualify as an electronic checklist due to lack of prompt allowing annotating the item as complete.

The aircraft’s electrical power source isn’t approved.

MEL allows dispatch with both EFB missing assuming that QRH and checklists are on board. [ ] pilots will depart without EFB with operational documents listed in MEL lacking QRH and checklists.
No contingency plan established for dual failure in flight. No back up for emergency checklists like smoke, Electrical emergency config or emergency evacuation.

In case of dual failure, it's a very serious threat in the sky. Please conduct a ramp inspection to verify.

**CHIRP Comment:** It is a National Aviation Authority’s role to determine for each aircraft type whether a particular type of EFB and software load should be approved for use with or without recourse to paper backups. The report, which concerns a non-EASA operator, was passed to the CAA; ramp inspections conducted prior to receiving the report and one following receipt had returned no related findings.

For interest, FEEDBACK readers may wish to be aware that EFB hardware classes include:

- **Class 1** - Standard Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment such as laptops or handheld electronic devices. These devices are used as loose equipment and are typically stowed during critical phases of flight. A Class 1 EFB is considered a Portable Electronic Device (PED). Class 1 EFBs, such as Cockpit iPads, may be used to display Type B applications in critical phases of flight provided that they are 'secured and viewable'.

- **Class 2** – Also Portable Electronic Devices, and range from modified COTS equipment to purpose-built devices. Mounting, power (ship's power as primary) or data connectivity of an EFB typically requires the application of a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), Type Certificate or Amended Type Certificate.

- **Class 3** – Considered "installed equipment" and subject to airworthiness requirements and, unlike PEDs, they must be under design control. The hardware is subject to a limited number of Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) requirements (for non-essential equipment—typically crash safety and Conducted and Radiated Emissions testing). Class 3 EFBs are typically installed under STC or other airworthiness approval.

The EFB may host a wide array of applications, categorized in three software categories:

- **Type A**
  - Static applications, such as document viewer (PDF, HTML, XML formats);
  - Flight Crew Operating Manuals, and other printed documents like airport NOTAM;

- **Type B**
  - Static or dynamic electronic "charts" to include (though not requiring) panning, zooming, and scrolling;

- **Type C**
  - For example: Airport Moving Map functionality deployed under a Technical Standard Order Authorization, and some elements of an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system. Type C applications are subject to airworthiness requirements and must run on Class 3 EFB.

EASA and the FAA have drafted new EFB classifications. EASA released new Acceptable Means of Compliance in its AMC 2025 document while the FAA has drafted a new Advisory Circular for EFBs which will become AC 120-76D. The previous Class 1, 2 and 3 categories have been replaced by two new categories: portable and installed:

- **Portable**
  - A portable EFB is a host platform, used on the flight deck, but not part of the aircraft’s certified configuration. It may carry Type A and Type B applications - failure will not directly affect the operation of the aircraft.

- **Installed**
  - An installed EFB may host Type A, B and C applications and also certified avionics applications. The installed EFB platform must obtain airworthiness approval, since it is considered an aircraft part. Software may need to be partitioned so that non-certified applications do not interfere with certified avionics applications.

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**EMERGENCY FUEL SWITCH COMPROMISED**

**Report Text:** Remote controlled push-back tractors have recently been introduced on stands [ ]. On [some of the stands] these tractors are being parked immediately in front of the Emergency Fuel Shutdown Switch. This area should be kept clear.

[The reporter included a number of references to Instructions and Manuals]. These state:
"No ground equipment shall be parked in the area immediately in front of the fuel hydrant Emergency Stop Button that could obstruct access to it in an emergency. The Fuel Hydrant Stop button (ESB) and access to fire extinguishers shall be clear at all times.

**CHIRP Comment:** The Airport Authority investigated the report and found that the tractor parking positions are, in some cases, placed adjacent to the head of stand area, which includes the fuel cut-off switch. However, sufficient space is maintained between the parking position and the fuel cut-off switch for personnel to access. There is no [Airport] standard which requires a large sterile area around such facilities. The Airport Authority considered that the time taken to reach the cut-off switch is not significantly increased as a result of the tractor parking position and therefore it is comfortable that it is compliant.

[The Airport Authority helpfully included photographs that are not included in FEEDBACK because they would identify the airport and the operator].

All reports to CHIRP are taken seriously and are welcome even when, as in this case, the reported issue turns out to be benign. It is far better to report a concern and have it investigated than to keep it to yourself!

### No Air-Conditioning Onboard

**Report Text:** I reported for a charter flight (for a Cruise Company) to [a destination in southern Europe].

Among several other flight specifications, we were rostered to land at 09:00 GMT to drop off the outgoing passengers and not take off again until 12:15 GMT in order to bring back the returning Cruise passengers. This meant a 03h15m turnaround. We were not allowed to leave the aircraft to spend time in the airport terminal.

The temperature outside (as per my iPhone app) was 34 degrees Celsius although it felt a lot hotter inside the aircraft cabin as the air conditioning had been turned off. We immediately raised the temperature issue with the SCCM who spoke to the Captain. His first suggestion was to keep the front left and rear left doors open in order to create ventilation and also to shut all right-hand-side window blinds, which the crew agreed to do. Once the cleaners had left the aircraft, the crew agreed that the little air blowing into the cabin from outside was hot air and we might be better off closing the aircraft doors. The SCCM agreed and authorised this. We were relying solely on air vents blowing warm air.

Within minutes we realised that this had not made it any more comfortable for us and that the next 3 hours would be very hard to bear. We again spoke to the SCCM who understood and shared our concerns. He contacted the Captain who informed us that he could not turn the air conditioning back on or the company would be fined. At this point, some of the crew had already removed neck wear in order to cool ourselves down a bit. Neither the ground power nor the aircraft’s own power were switched on at this point.

As the time went by, the crew felt hotter and hotter and became angry that we were not being looked after. The Captain was contacted at least 3 times and every time he refused to turn the air conditioning on. He maintained that this was due to not only the company policy but also [ ] Airport rules. Interestingly, the week before I had talked to another Captain about this and their position was that the cabin could not go above a certain temperature for reasons of Health & Safety. I then spoke to a different Captain the day after this incident and again was told that the crew had not been looked after as expected of the Commander.

After 3 hours on the ground, we started to board the flight and the air conditioning was finally turned on, but not until boarding started. Unfortunately, the temperature inside the cabin had reached such height that the air conditioning was not coping with the [circa 200] passengers boarding. Almost an hour later, with all passengers sitting on board and ready for take-off, many passengers and crew were still fanning themselves with safety cards, newspapers and magazines in order to cool themselves down and many passengers complained of unsafe temperatures on board. It wasn’t until after take-off that the cabin finally started to cool down.

Even more worryingly, this is not an isolated incident but instead company policy for the last 2 or 3 years in order to save fuel and this is discussed daily with pilots. Some days the Captain on the day decides to keep the crew and passengers safe and comfortable but other days the Captain decides to save fuel and let the cabin temperature rise to unsafe and uncomfortable levels.

No crew member seems to know the definite rule regarding safe cabin temperature levels. All cabin crew members were in agreement that we were not treated well or looked after.

**Lessons Learned** - No lessons were learned as a result of the incident. My only suggestion is that crew members be treated as human beings.

**Company Comment:** The outside air temperature was 34C.
On arrival there was a lack of ground staff, disembarkation was slow and probably not finished until a good 40 mins after arrival. Ground power also took at least 30-40 mins to organise even though it was parked on our remote stand.

The Captain asked the crew to close all the window blinds on the right side of the aircraft soon after arrival. At no point during the turnaround was the aircraft not powered.

The Captain also requested ground air conditioning with the dispatcher shortly after arrival, it arrived at the aircraft side over an hour after arrival and was connected and switched on within about 15mins.

Steps had been connected to doors 2L and 4L, after the cleaners had finished and with the APU still running the Captain walked to the back of the aircraft. The cabin was warm approx. 28° (the APU on this aircraft wasn’t a particularly good one). They spoke with the cabin crew about how best to cool the cabin, and recommended that the rear door be closed.

Their initial reaction was that they wanted to have a breeze flowing through the cabin, they mentioned that a 34° breeze was not helping to cool the cabin and it would be better to close all doors on the aircraft during the extended turnaround.

When the APU was turned off approximately 75mins after arrival, it had been maintaining a cabin temp between 27° and 28°, ground air conditioning was used instead.

During this time the SCCM had spoken to the Captain once about the uncomfortable conditions. The Captain informed the SCCM that they were doing their utmost to keep the cabin cool but they would not be starting the APU at this time, but would switch it back on before passengers boarded. The ground air was disconnected and the APU started around 15 mins before passengers boarded.

At no time was the aircraft without power or APU/ground air conditioning during the turnaround, the total time the ground air was in use was 60mins.

Unfortunately an early request to be able to spend the turnaround inside the terminal was refused by the [Company] station manager apparently due to security issues.

**CHIRP Comment:** High temperatures can affect crew performance and contribute to poor behaviour by passengers. The Captain found himself in a difficult position; the aircraft was on a remote stand on a very hot day with no wind and a long wait before the passengers arrived for the flight home. Opening the aircraft cabin doors was unlikely to assist in cooling the cabin in these circumstances and, while it is not uncommon for crews to be required to remain on board, it is unclear if there were genuine security issues preventing the crew from disembarking the aircraft or who had the authority to make the decision. The provision of ground equipment and services is a contractual issue and unless aircraft Commanders have visibility of the contract provisions they are unable to insist on compliance. It would be good practice for operators to make this information readily available to aircraft Commanders for any destination they are required to use.

This report and comments will be published in Cabin Crew FEEDBACK with a further explanation of the difficulties sometimes faced by aircraft Commanders.

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**BAGGAGE SECURITY BREACH – UNIDENTIFIED BAG LOADED**

**Report Text:** [ ] Airport has a new self-bag drop area. Passengers are directed through barriers into an area which involves their identification being checked and then being directed to self-check in and drop off their bags. On Friday morning a member of staff opened the barrier to let some people through to speed up the process, and after the member of staff did not close up the barrier again and the staff checking the identification did not notice that passengers were able to pass behind them and enter the secure area without their identities being checked before they dropped off their bags. This led to possibly a large number of bags being dropped off without confirming who they belonged to. It took around 20 minutes for a member of staff to realise this error and close the barrier.

Lessons Learned - Barriers are not to be moved, or a clearer set up of barriers that prevent the queue being behind the backs of those who at the point of security.

**CHIRP Comment:** The Airport Operator has advised that the self-bag drop operation at [ ] was newly introduced by the airlines this summer and, as with many new processes, some areas for improvement were identified during daily de-briefs. As a result of receiving feedback [Airline] has explained that whilst staff received training on the process a number of less experienced seasonal workers were also on duty who, perhaps, lacked some of the experience required to recognise when things were not working correctly.

[The airline] put in place remedial action to remedy this breach of the passenger screening process and the Airport Authority has also inspected the operation and is reassured that it is running effectively and is compliant from a security perspective. The Airport Authority will also keep an eye on it going forward.
The CAA has recently published its UK Aviation Safety Review for 2016, CAP1595. Do not be put off by the date. The review contains a wealth of information, facts and figures that will be of interest to aviation professionals as well as the Review’s declared target audience – the travelling public.

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Contact Us

Ian Dugmore - Chief Executive
John Dunne - Deputy Director (Engineering)
Flight Crew/ATC Reports
Maintenance/Engineer Reports

CHIRP, Centaur House, Ancells Business Park, Ancells Road, FLEET, GU51 2UJ

Freefone (UK only): 0800 772 3243 or Telephone: +44 (0) 1252 378947
E-mail: mail@chirp.co.uk

Registered in England No: 3253764
Registered Charity: 1058262

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