

CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 91

Summer 2009

EDITORIAL

As many readers will be aware, this Programme is sponsored by the Civil Aviation Authority (Safety Regulation Group). Although the Programme is governed by an independent Board of Trustees, the CAA does of course need to be assured that it is cost-effective and for this reason the aviation programmes are subject to an independent review every five years; the next is scheduled to be conducted in November of this year.

In addition to an objective assessment of the cost effectiveness of the programme by the Review Board, it is important that the programmes are perceived by the relevant user groups as making a positive contribution to flight safety. We are therefore inviting comments from flight crew members, ATCOs, engineers and managers.

If you wish to comment please use any of the methods available, the attached report form, submit a comment via our website: www.chirp.co.uk or e-mail us at: confidential@chirp.co.uk.


All comments received by the Review date will be made available to the Review Board.

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ATC REPORTS

Most Frequent ATC Issues Received
12 Months to June 2009



- Communications - External**
(Pilots)
- Air Traffic Management**
(Separation, Level of Service)
- Company Policies**
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
- Relationship Management**
(Planning, Managers)
- Airports**
(Runways, Bird Control, Infrastructure)
- Duty**
(Length, Rest)
- Security**
(Ground)

AIRFIELD CHANGES

Report Text: This situation hasn't resulted in an incident yet, and hopefully never will; however, it has introduced an extra opportunity for human error.

At ##### (UK regional airport) one runway has been out of service for an extended period of time, and then was notified as closed. During this time all of the airfield markings and signage were still in place as for an operational runway. We were told that the airport operator had no money available in the budget to remove the markings and signage. That is until one weekend recently. I turned up for work to find that work was underway to remove the surface markings and signage. On the face of it this shouldn't really be any cause for concern, but there are a number of aspects that I find worrying.

AIR TRANSPORT FEEDBACK is also available on the **CHIRP** website - www.chirp.co.uk

An Air Transport Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

The UK AIP airfield map had been changed two weeks previously to show new airfield holding points, which were significantly different from what was in existence on the airfield and what ATC were using.

The ATC copies of the AIP had not been amended with the new maps, so there was no awareness in ATC of the potential discrepancy between what was displayed on the ATC maps, and what was in existence on the airfield. Rumour has it that the airport company were suddenly panicked into action as there was a CAA airfield inspection due to take place shortly after the weekend. Whatever the reason for the sudden burst of activity, the first that ATC knew about the changes appears to have been on the Friday prior to commencing the work. The changes appear to have been decided without any reference to ATC and the impact that they will have on our procedures.

A Temporary Operating Instruction had to be rushed out but was based on a flawed understanding of the changes and contained errors that were not apparent until the work was completed on the Sunday evening.

The removal and renaming of holding points has created the potential for confusion and error where there was no need to. For example, on one taxiway holding point A3 has been removed, and what was holding point A4 has now been renamed A3. Another taxiway had a holding point at each end. Z1 was next to the closed runway, and Z2 was next to a main runway. What was Z1 has now been removed, and Z2 has been renamed Z1. I don't know what hazard analysis was carried out by the airport operator regarding this, but it seemed like a glaring trap from an ATC point of view.

I am aware that there is a standard for the naming of taxiway holding points which must be adhered to, but the removal of A3 was unnecessary, as even though it was no longer needed as an entry point for the closed runway it would be a useful holding point to resolve ground conflicts in some circumstances. If A3 had remained then there would have been no need to rename A4 as A3. It didn't even need to have a stop bar, so the expense would have been minimal.

I understand that there was no way to avoid renaming Z2, as I believe you can't have a Z2 without a Z1, however I feel it is irresponsible to rename a holding point next to the runway with a name that was previously (right up until earlier that day) in a different location. I feel that to prevent errors it would have been better to rename the whole taxiway, so that any reference to Z1 would be instantly flagged as a mistake. Again the cost of doing so would be minimal, if any.

After the weekend, a hazard analysis was carried out by ATC management; my colleagues raised all of these points, but nothing changed. Conveniently, we are told that all of the hazards we pointed out are mitigated, but in my opinion there was no need for them to be there in the first place.

It concerns me that the way the airport company carried out this process was in itself a hazard to flight safety. I do not feel that the lessons of the 2003 incident involving work in progress on the runway at

Manchester airport have been learned. ATC and the airport company should be working together to implement changes in the safest possible way, not ATC having to pick up the pieces and try to mitigate hazards at short notice after they have been introduced.

CHIRP Comment: The notice of the changes afforded to ATC (48 hours) was less than adequate to prepare an ATC instruction and brief controllers. The advice from ATC providers is that a reasonable period would be not less than 14 days to ensure that ATC and locally based flight crews are aware.

Moreover, it should be remembered that in addition to local notices, significant airfield changes should be promulgated in a manner that will ensure that flight crews not locally based are also aware. In the past this has not been the case, even with changes at major UK airports. These points have been raised with the Airport Operators' Association.

SRATCOH - UNDER PRESSURE?

Report Text: Over the past couple of years I have been becoming increasingly concerned that my Unit management has begun to regard the Scheme for Regulation of ATCO hours (SRATCOH) as an optional system.

It appears that on numerous occasions supervisory staff are attending meetings or carrying out other administrative tasks during their "intervals between duty periods"; in particular before, between or after night duties. These meetings are said to be "must attend" meetings. Whilst I accept that it is a moot point insofar as these attendances clearly do not count as "Duty Periods" as defined in the SRATCOH because there is no possibility that the individuals concerned will be required to exercise the privileges of their licenses, it seems to me to be against the spirit of the scheme.

These supervisors can, and do, provide ATC services during their shifts even if only to maintain currency. The following is a direct quote from the original CRATCOH report: "We have proposed protective measures designed to inhibit the onset of fatigue and to combat it by means of adequate recovery intervals between shifts. The protection so afforded is in the interests of safety and is should be neither disregarded nor abused." Whilst such wording never actually made it into the SRATCOH scheme, I am of the opinion that attending meetings before, between or after night duties is an abuse especially if it occurs more than occasionally. I naively thought that the Regulator would be broadly supportive of my view that these activities were an abuse of the scheme but several recent events, which appear to have been sanctioned by the CAA, would appear to indicate that this is not the case.

When I first became a controller it was hard to believe that controllers' hours had not been regulated prior to SRATCOH. It appears that we are sleepwalking back to the bad old days.

CHIRP Comment: A summary of the reporter's comments was forwarded to CAA ATSD, who subsequently provided a detailed response from which the following summary is taken:

1. SRATCOH defines period of duty as;

Paragraph 2.1: The period between the actual commencement of and the actual end of a shift during which an air traffic controller whose licence contains a rating valid at the unit exercises, or could be called upon to exercise, the privileges of the licence at that unit, and includes prescribed breaks, time spent on other duties such as training, airfield inspection, meteorological observations, collection of landing fees, administration and any extension of duty.

It may be argued by Unit Management that administrative tasks, such as a meeting, that take place outside the normal period of duty when there is no intention whatsoever that the Air Traffic Controller concerned exercises the privilege of his or her licence, do not fall into the definition of 'period of duty'. However, the CAA would look very closely at circumstances where meetings were scheduled to take place between two shifts (particularly night shifts) and had the potential to compromise the minimum rest periods between duties as stipulated in SRATCOH.

2. Furthermore, SRATCOH also states;

Paragraph 1.1: The purpose of SRATCOH is to ensure, so far as is reasonably possible, that controller fatigue does not endanger aircraft and thereby to assist controllers to provide a safe and effective service. In all cases the management of controller rostering should be sympathetic to this purpose.

The CAA expects Unit Managers to apply in a genuine, but reasonable, fashion the overall concept of this paragraph and SRATCOH as a whole. If the CAA should obtain any significant evidence that SRATCOH is being ignored, or "worked around", we will take a much closer look at the units involved via the Regional Inspectorate and audit processes.

MORE ON SPEED CONTROL PHRASEOLOGY

Report Text: In FEEDBACK 88 you published a flight crew report relating to the phraseology that has become commonplace in the UK in recent years.

I would firstly like to say that we use speed control to allow us to deal with more aircraft in our sectors; it is generally an easier option than headings because it uses less airspace overall and allows streams of outbounds and inbounds routing in similar directions to remain separate. In addition, aircraft on their own navigation to the next waypoint are more predictable than those that are put on headings, which can be forgotten or allow traffic to converge when there are wind shear conditions at high level. So we do need to use speed control.

I have used phraseology such as "on transition", "on conversion", "when able", "make your speed xxx", "reduce your speed to xxx" and others as well. They are all used in certain specific conditions (using mach speeds or IAS or a combination) related to whether you want to restrict the maximum or minimum speed of the aircraft, and most importantly, issue clearances that are safe. These instructions require monitoring to confirm that as a result of the speeds issued that separation is not being eroded. The report in Issue 88 asked for some standardisation of phraseology. I am

all for this; however, no one phrase can cover all of the problems that we encounter on high level sectors with streams of traffic of various type and therefore various speeds for cruise and descent.

Recently, an SI (Supplementary Instruction) was issued to advise that the new phraseology to be used was "when able make your speed xxx". This SI gave the impression that this was the only phrase to be used and was mandatory. I have heard that this is not meant to be the case (hopefully), but other phrases are allowed; it seems that the overriding concern is that we are not to use the phrase "on transition" (Due to possible confusion with the Transition Level!) Unfortunately, it seems that most ATCO's at this Unit do not realise that other phrases are allowed.

The reaction to this SI has not been good. A significant number of controllers think that it is potentially dangerous to issue this type of instruction in certain circumstances. One of the supervisors at this unit has issued a letter to his staff advising them that it is mandatory to use this phrase, that they must use it themselves and that they should speak to other controllers who are not using it correctly. Fortunately, most controllers are an inherently safe bunch of people and do not want to be forced to use a phrase that they think may be potentially unsafe. If the experts in this field think that something is possibly unsafe then they should be listened to. This unit has gone out of its way in recent years to ram safety down our throats at every possible opportunity. This is fine in most circumstances until the controller thinks it is potentially unsafe. We must be listened to. One response that I heard from A CAPC was "How do you know it is unsafe? If you see it causing a problem then file a report." Isn't that bolting the stable door after the horses have left!!! THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT.

The reason why this phrase is problematic for us is as follows: Three aircraft ALL AT FL330, all at M 0.81 (IAS showing 280 kts approx); AAA 123 B767 (NUMBER 1) CRUISING AT M 0.81; 10 MILES BEHIND IS BBB456 B747 (NUMBER 2) SPEED REDUCED TO M 0.81; 10 miles behind is CCC789 B747 (NUMBER 3) SPEED REDUCED TO M 0.81 OR LESS; everything is fine.

Now we need to issue a descent clearance. "AAA123 DESCEND FL 140, WHEN ABLE MAKE YOUR SPEED 300 KTS OR MORE". "BBB456 DESCEND FL140 WHEN ABLE MAKE YOUR SPEED 300 KTS EXACTLY". CCC789 DESCEND FL140 WHEN ABLE MAKE YOUR SPEED 300 KTS OR LESS. At first glance, and when you are not an expert, this seems OK - but BBB456 could now increase speed immediately to 300kts which would probably equate to M0.84 at FL 330. AAA123 is continuing at his cruise speed of M0.81 (280kts), he is now being caught up. The pilot of BBB456 may not do this, he may carry on at his reduced mach number, but the 3rd aircraft may speed up instead, so now we have a very unknown situation.

Hopefully, you will see our problem. I think it is imperative that an SI is issued as soon as possible to clarify which phrases controllers can use so that the confusion and anxiety can be quelled. My final points relate to the "If it ain't broke then don't fix it" bin. I have been a controller for more than 20 years on various

sectors and I can honestly say that in all of the thousands of speed control clearances I have issued every year using the phrases listed at the beginning of this "rant" I have only had one instance when a pilot did not fly his aircraft as I expected him to do. I was monitoring the situation and fixed it. This new phrase is much more open to interpretation and therefore, we will not be able rely on a sequence of events.

And finally, once again a procedure is brought in which is not properly thought through. Mostly, the changes we get are of little consequence and we are able to work around any problems and get them changed quickly. However, on this occasion the directive has come from SRG and it is difficult to work around it when it is mandatory. Some feedback was sought from this Unit, although I am not able to say what was passed back to SRG.

CHIRP Comment: As a result of the initial report published in FEEDBACK 88, the CAA/industry joint RTF Phraseology Working Group conducted a review, considered multiple options, and agreed on the phraseology as published in SI No 2009/05. Subsequently, operational feedback from NATS to the CAA highlighted concerns similar to those in the report above. Consequently, in June a further meeting was held between CAA and NATS, after which the CAA issued Supplementary Instruction (SI) No. 2009/09. The new instruction specifies the phrase, "On speed conversion, xxx knots", but in the case where a controller requires an aircraft to fly the specified IAS as soon as practicable, the phrase "When able..." is to be used. The SI further states that the use of the term 'on transition' is not to be used by controllers due to the potential for misinterpretation by pilots, as it is also used in the context of RNAV in some States. The SI is published on the CAA website.

REDUNDANCY AND SAFETY

Report Text: Recently, all members of staff were required to attend a short notice management meeting (people on rest days were asked to attend). The purpose of the meeting was understood to be information on an expected pay rise. Following an announcement about a small salary increase, the meeting took an unexpected turn with the notification that every individual was under threat of redundancy due to changes in the Unit contract. Staff were then given a letter inviting them to a consultation meeting several days later, at which the unit management would be making decisions about each person's future. The meeting ended as abruptly as it started.

Shortly after the meeting the entire management group left early for the weekend, leaving staff members upset, lost & rather bewildered at the news that had just been dropped on them without any warning. Individuals were left to their own devices to digest the information over the weekend. This was unpleasant for those lucky enough to have a weekend off but for those individuals who were rostered to work the threat of redundancy was potentially dangerously distracting.

Having the sword of redundancy hanging over one's head is not a safe position from any point of view. A

controller worrying about losing their job will not be giving 100% of their concentration to the task in hand, no matter how confident they may appear.

Whilst I feel certain that any individual at this unit normally has the integrity and maturity to declare themselves fit (or unfit) for duty if that were the case, a controller worrying about being selected for redundancy is not going to give management a reason for making them redundant by either declaring themselves unfit or 'rocking the boat' by speaking to management about their fears. Obviously, it remains the duty of each individual to decide whether they are fit for work, but following any incident involving a thorough investigation, where would an ATCO stand if it could be construed that he/she was under undue pressure of redundancy at work? Most staff members feel trapped in this 'Catch 22' situation.

Lessons Learned: I'm afraid I have no suggestions for cure, other than to remind other ATCOs that the responsibility of deciding whether or not they are fit for work lies firmly with them.

CHIRP Comment: It might have been anticipated that an announcement about redundancy would result in increased stress levels in some if not all of those individuals affected; consequently, it would have been appropriate for the Unit management to have made provision for mitigating the latent safety risk arising from their actions.

SI's TO CAP 493/ATSINS

The following CAA (SRG) ATS Standards Department ATSINS and Supplementary Instructions (SI) to CAP 493 MATS Part 1 have been issued since **16 April 2009**:

SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS:

Number 2009/06 - Issued: 24 April 2009 - Effective: Immediate

Procedures and Phraseology Concerning Level Restrictions Associated with Standard Instrument Departures

Number 2009/04 (Issue 4) - Issued: 21 May 2009 - Effective: Immediate

Wake Turbulence Separation Minima

Number 2009/07 - Issued: 2 June 2009 - Effective: 1 July 2009

ATS to Aircraft Formations

Number 2009/08 - (Issue 2) Issued: 8 July 2009 - Effective: Immediate

En Route Wake Turbulence Separation Minima

Number 2009/09 - Issued: 1 July 2009 - Effective: Immediate

Revised Procedures and Phraseology for Speed Control Applicable to an Aircraft at or Near the Level at Which Speed Changes from Mach Number to Indicated Airspeed (IAS)

ATSINS:

Number 157 - Issued 1 May 2009

Contingency Planning - Swine Influenza

Number 158 - Issued 13 May 2009

S-Band Primary Surveillance Radar - Potential Co-existence Issues with 2.6GHz

Number 159 - Issued 14 May 2009

CAA Olympic and Paralympic Games Steering Group (COPSG)

Number 133 (Issue 2) - Issued 30 June 2009

SES Compliance Matrix

Number 160 - Issued 1 July 2009

Accident, AIRPROX and Incident Reporting Procedures - Replacement of Forms CA 1261/1262

Number 161 - Issued 6 July 2009

Mareva Injunctions and Actions Required by Air Traffic Service Providers

Number 162 - Issued 6 July 2009

EUROCONTROL Consultation: Air Traffic Engineer - Competence Assessment

CAA (SRG) ATS Information Notices are published on the CAA website -


www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

ENGINEERING EDITORIAL

In the last issue of FEEDBACK (Issue 90) we published a **CHIRP** analysis of maintenance errors reported in MORs, which identified errors during installation of components as the predominant feature.

The following categories of installation error were identified from reports relating to operations in 2008.

MOR Data (2008) - Installation error types



The following ATA headings are presented in descending order of arisings with key examples provided in each category, not all of these errors were the subject of a MEDA investigation and therefore the root cause for such events is not always readily identifiable.

As indicated previously, events such as these are a continuing feature in maintenance arisings and in comparison with other error types, the level of installation errors as an overall percentage has remained similar over a number of years representing approximately half of all CAA MOR maintenance related reports.

ATA 32 - Gears (11%)

NLG lock actuator attachment bolt loose and split pin locking missing.

Incorrect Brake Steering Control Unit fitted resulting in steering failure.

MLG wiring loom incorrectly routed chaffing against flying control cables.

Wheel spacer missing following nose wheel change.

ATA 27 - Flying Controls (10%)

Rag found wedged in elevator, jammed control surface in full nose down position.

Aileron bus cable quadrant retainer incorrectly fitted. (Item subject to an Independent inspection?)

Elevator movement reduced due primary stop fitted 180deg displaced and cables under tensioned. (Item subject to an Independent inspection?)

Leading edge slat auxiliary track sensor fitted 180deg displaced causing slat damage. (Item subject to an Independent inspection?)

ATA 25 - Cabin Equipment (9%)


Slide girt bar release cable missing.

Missing clips on overwing slide controller, failed to deploy.

Floor proximity lighting found inoperative following unrecorded carpet change.

ENGINEER REPORTS

**Most Frequent Engineering Issues Received:
12 Months to June 2009**



- Maintenance**
(Line, Base, Repairs)
- Security**
(Ground)
- Company Policies**
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
- Regulation/Law**
(Compliance With)
- Pressure**
(Commercial, From Management/Supervision, Time)
- Documentation**
(Suitability/Adequacy)
- Licensing**
(Regulation/Qualifications)
- Procedures**
(Used by Others, Adequacy, Existence)
- Communications - Internal**
(Team, Shift, Management)

Instrument panel glare shield held in position by wiring harness, attachment screws missing.

ATA 35 - Oxygen (6%)

Crew oxygen bottle not fully opened after installation causing flow restriction.

Flight Crew oxygen bottle not turned on after replacement.

Crew oxygen generator firing pin wrongly positioned rendering unit inoperative.

Aircraft oxygen system serviced with nitrogen.

ATA 23 - Communications (4%)

Incorrect CVR fitted.

ANR batteries fell during take-off disconnecting pilot headset lead.

Incorrect audio select panel fitted.

HF system defect outside MEL limits for ETOPS flight.

ATA 72 - Engine (7%)

Severe damage to engine - torch not removed from intake after inspection.

Fan case engine stand mount not removed before flight.

Borescope plugs found loose on engine.

Tools not removed from engine coldstream duct following overnight maintenance.

ATA 71 - Powerplant (5%)

Engine access panel detached on take-off.

Engine oil fill servicing panel detached in flight, previously oil leak check carried out.

Engine intake cowl fire extinguisher access panel separated in flight, wrong part fitted.

Engine pylon access panel lodged in pipe work of RH 'C' duct.

ATA 79 - Oil (4%)

Engine oil level over filled.

Major oil leak due to missing component on gear box mounting pad following engine change.

Following MCD replacement, failure to identify metal contamination which required engine change.

The key question we need to ask ourselves is why do such errors continue at a similar level? Human Factors training is a compulsory part of an engineer's learning programme, together with bi-annual Continuation Training when such issues are commonly discussed. Maintenance organisations also seek to improve process and procedures, and simplify documentation. Today's operating environment with its attendant pressure to maintain schedules may form part of the issue, distractions and time constraints can all conspire against us during a genuine attempt to achieve the best results. However, a significant number of events still appear to occur as a result of individuals not referring to technical information or maintenance manual instructions that are available, instead preferring to rely on their experience and intuition.

From engineers' feedback to **CHIRP** it is clear that they hold strong feelings regarding their professionalism and have similar expectations for other engineers. Events such as those identified in these incidents are not readily tolerated in the industry, but 'honest errors' still occur. Engineers can certainly help raise standards by involving themselves in their company's evolving Safety Management System and being proactive in identifying where changes are required; similarly managers can assist in providing

practical support to achieve tangible improvements and inspire greater trust in the system. This does require extra effort by all concerned and it is worth considering the old adage, 'Safety improvement is no accident'.... but unfortunately, it sometimes takes an accident to improve safety!

The CAA has recently issued Paper 2009/05 'Aircraft Maintenance Incident Analysis'; this provides further information on the causal or contributory factors identified in maintenance related events and is available via the CAA website.

COMPANY APPROVAL INTERVIEWS

Report Text: I have been in the industry for over 20 years from apprentice through to licensed engineer, so I'd like to think that I know what is acceptable when it comes to maintenance actions and procedures. However, I have found it very hard to comprehend a recent issue within my place of work.

Many of you, being licensed engineers, may remember having an internal interview before being awarded your company approvals. Some of you may remember this as a terribly daunting day or possibly just a walk in the park. It may have been full of technical questions or discussions on company procedures, either way I bet it made you aware of what was expected from you and made you brush up on the matters concerned.

What I would like to know is how this is regulated? If at all! Shouldn't these interviews be making us aware of our new personal responsibilities? Familiarising us with company paperwork and procedures? (Tech Log entries, Form ones, critical tasks etc). Not telling us "don't walk round the hanger with a brew in your hand" Or reminding us to read CAP 562? (CAA info and procedures), not saying "only inspect what it states on the work card" (implying to ignore any other defect's in that area). With regard to the last statement, for well established licensed engineers it is easier to stand your ground and work as you believe, not being bullied into submission to cut corners and then hoping problems will go away when your eyes are closed. For newly qualified engineers it is a lot harder to do this and if you don't have the civil aviation background you may feel pressurised into complying with the management instead of general aviation ethics.

If this is the case (which I know it to be) recently qualified engineers are being misled from day one and the industry is beginning to breed "yes" men instead of engineers who you should be trusting with your life or your family and friends lives. Quality aircraft maintenance is becoming harder due to financial and time constraints as it is, without jeopardising it any further. Surely we need to have these approval interviews standardised and made productive without delay.

Lessons Learned: Standardise approval interviews across the board.

CHIRP Comment: The reporter's concerns were represented to the CAA, who advised that a similar situation existed with both the oral examination aspects for the issue of a licence and also the issue of a company authorisation. In the case of the latter, there

is currently no real guidance in EASA Pt 145; Pt 145.A.30 requires that certifying staff are competent, without defining how this is to be established. Historically, in the UK, the Quality Department conducted an oral exam; however, this is no longer explicitly prescribed in the requirements. The CAA has concluded that the current situation needs to be revisited, since a number of incidents involving maintenance errors have indicated a lack of familiarity with company procedures and documentation; familiarity with the relevant procedures/documentation had been tested previously prior to the issue of a CRS qualification. The CHIRP analysis of MEMS and CAAMOR reports of maintenance is being considered as the possible basis for a representation to EASA.

Two further points in the report are worthy of clarification. CAP562 is being revised and the current issue is out of date in some respects. Also, the reporter's comment about being required by the company to inspect only the area defined by the task card could be detrimental to general safety standards as good maintenance practice is to visually inspect areas adjacent to that being worked.

SAFETY TRAINING

Report Text: My concern at this present time is the control of Human Factors and Fuel Tank Safety training and the financial abuse of contractors.

Having sat and participated in my first Human Factors Course two years and four months ago, at a cost to myself of £100 and a loss of two days income, I found myself then having to sit a course again in September 2008. I spent weeks/ days/ hours scouring the internet and talking with the CAA about where and how I find a course. The CAA at one point recommended I learned the course myself and then teach it! I spoke with all the reputable companies advertised on the net and companies that I knew that had run courses for their permanent staff, but these did not do refresher courses. So in the end I was lucky enough to find an agency that ran a course for the sum of roughly £160+VAT; this also included the Fuel Tank Level 1 training.

Now I live in an area which is surrounded by four International airports and who knows how many small independent airports and are there any courses being run at any of these airports? Answer; a resounding NO!

On completion of the above courses I was offered work in Europe which I accepted, but with a proviso that I would have to take a Fuel Tank Level 2 course at a cost of 180 Euros, as Fuel Tank Level 1 is not compliant with them. I rang the CAA and asked for clarification and was told the usual, it depends on the facility and how it interprets the regulations. I then went to work for another European organisation and wasn't asked for Human Factors or Fuel Tank Level 1; my Human Factors had even expired!

I was thinking of taking work in London on some of the Olympic building sites but for this I need to do a CSCS course (safety course). When I made enquiries about this course I found there are numerous companies running courses all over London and surrounding areas

for costs varying from £20 - £45. The building and construction industry seems to have its house in order, but where and how far lagging is the aviation industry. Having spoken to other contracting engineers some have been charged for the Human Factors refresher course and are totally unaware of the Fuel Tank course.

Also, I turned up for my refresher course and at no time was I asked to prove I had done the course two years previously.

It strikes me that the course supposedly set up for contractors and run by agencies are a massive money making exercise and the CAA resorts to its only fallback position by stating that it's up to the individual facility.

I hope before 2010 when I take another course the aviation industry has pulled up its socks.

What would be wrong in the CAA asking or enforcing all facilities that use contract labour or even agencies keeping their temporary labour fully aware of training courses that are up and coming and also that a fully compliant with every facility throughout Europe.

Also my other query is how does the FASS course hold water? Two years ago people were told if they paid £X amount up front they would get the refresher course through the post and their FASS books would be stamped to say they have done the course. Are they aware of the Fuel Tank level 1 course?

Maybe to give the CAA and the courses some credence they should be called Human Factors Whatever and Fuel Tank Safety Whatever, or maybe have a warning stamped on them saying that these courses may only be applicable in some facilities.

CHIRP Comment: The fuel tank training referenced in this report is based on the requirements of SFAR88 regarding the potential risk of fire/explosion particularly associated with system interfaces; it also includes elements of the ageing wiring analysis of previous incidents. The CAA acknowledges that the provision of training is a difficult issue to resolve for contractor engineers, such as the reporter. Whereas companies provide training for full-time staff, they tend to absolve themselves of responsibility for this type of training for contractors and expect the individual to be appropriately trained.

Usually, Level 1 training is required by engineers who work under supervision in and around fuel tanks and Level 2 training is required for inspectors; however, the level of training required can vary arbitrarily depending on the company concerned. The principal difficulty in determining the standard of training is that EASA does not provide clear guidance for the scope of training necessary. This lack of guidance particularly affects UK contractors who work for a number of companies throughout EASA Member States. The CAA has previously sought additional clarification from EASA, but this had not been forthcoming.

We have represented the reporter's concerns to the new Rulemaking Director, EASA.

AN ELECTRIFYING EXPERIENCE!

Report Text: I am employed as a contract B1 certifying engineer, carrying out line maintenance and rectification. On this occasion, I was requested to carry

out fault investigation into a suspect electrical fault. The previous operating crew had left the aircraft de-powered in a safe condition. I was able to access the electrical panel and components. After 15-20 minutes, the next operating crew arrived at the aircraft. The pilot saw that I was working in the electrical panel, but he immediately applied full aircraft electrical power via the Ground Power Unit.

I saw and "felt" the electrical arc, but luckily at the time I had withdrawn my hands from the panel. I was very lucky no injury or damage occurred as a result. I told the pilot in polite straight-forward terms that he should never apply power to the aircraft without clearance from technicians.

Afterwards I reported the incident to my line manager; their response was that I should be more polite and considerate when addressing the crew. The fact that I was highlighting an event that could have led to serious injury was secondary to the fact that I had spoken firmly to the crew.

CHIRP Comment: This report is a good reminder that ensuring a safe working environment is the responsibility of all concerned and that in a Line environment the pressures to resolve technical problems and maintain the schedule might be greater than during routine servicing.

Good working practice requires electrical power to be isolated and relevant switches/controls to be 'flagged' with a warning not to operate. In this particular case, this does not appear to have been done and, combined with a breakdown in communication with the oncoming flight crew, led to the incident.

CAA (SRG) AIRCOMS

The following CAA (SRG) ATS Airworthiness Communications (AIRCOMS) have been issued since **16 April 2009**

2009/04

CAA Olympic and Paralympic Games Steering Group (COPSG)

2009/05

Maintenance of Instrument Vacuum System Component

CAA (SRG) AIRCOMS are published on the CAA website (www.caa.co.uk). Any queries can be addressed to Airworthiness Strategy and Policy Department (requirements@caa.co.uk)

SECURITY

In the last three month period, flight crew members and engineers have submitted a further 16 reports of problems associated with airport security/searches. As we approach the third anniversary of the introduction of the 'new' procedures, it is disappointing that the number of security related reports submitted is not significantly less than that received shortly after the procedures were introduced in August 2006.

Since that time, we have represented reporters' concerns in meetings with the following:

- Chief Executive Airport Operators Association
- Director BAA Security
- Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

We have made written submissions on behalf of reporters to:

- Secretary of State for Transport
- Permanent Under Secretary Dept. for Transport
- Head TRANSEC

We have also participated in a further recent submission by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Transport.

We will continue to seek improvements in the way some searches on flight crew members, engineers and ATCOs are conducted and promote the need for an effective complaints procedure.

Please continue to report any incidents that could have a subsequent impact on flight safety, either by MOR or in a **CHIRP** report to ensure that a body of evidence is available.

The following two reports involve a different aspect of security:

SEGREGATION OF INBOUND/OUTBOUND CREWS

(1)

Report Text Yet again UK airport security procedures seem determined to impair flight safety for no good reason. Departing from a London airport, I am advised that the airport security regulations do not allow the outbound crew to interface 'airside' with the inbound crew. Thus a useful opportunity to discuss/review the aircraft technical status and any operational matters before departure is negated.

Since the same ground/handling staff meet the aircraft and crew on arrival, and are not required to revisit a security point before meeting the departing crew at the aircraft, what is achieved? Unfortunately the expression "Only in the UK" comes to mind.

(2)

Report Text: Trying to vacate an aircraft at our European destination, we had to pass back through security. The new crew were just coming in through the same security screen (at the gate) with all the passengers behind them. We went to greet them, only to have security scream at the top of their voices, "No touching, stay away, no touching allowed".

Now call me an old cynic, but if I had a kilo of semtex or hash on the aircraft, I would not bring it out to the new crew just so they can take it back to the same aircraft. Likewise, any contraband the new crew could pass to us would end up outside the airport, which is where they had just come from.

What, then, was all this screaming and shouting all about, in front of all the passengers? It quite upset the cabin staff as they are non-UK Nationals and a crew-


change normally requires a great deal of hugging and kissing. They were not happy bunnies.

CHIRP Comment: As the second report indicates, the segregation of inbound/outbound crews for security reasons is not confined to UK airports.

In the event that you require to exchange operational information such as en route weather, winds etc., request a meeting with the other captain on grounds of flight safety. If security refuses your request, submit a Mandatory Occurrence Report.

FLIGHT CREW REPORTS

**Most Frequent Flight Crew Issues Received:
12 Months to June 2009**



- Security**
(Ground)
- Duty**
(Rosters/Rostering, Rest, Length, Crewing, Disruption)
- Company Policies**
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
- Communication - External**
(ATC/Regulators)
- Documentation**
(Suitability/Adequacy)
- Relationship Management**
(Planning, Managers)
- Air Traffic Management**
(Use by Others, Adequacy, Use by Reporter)
- Procedures**
(Used by Others, Adequacy, Existence)
- Pressure**
(Commercial, From Management/Supervision, Time)
- Ground Handling**
(Systems, Propulsion, Structure)

NAVIGATION CONFUSION

Report Text: We departed AAA (UK major airport) on an IFR flight plan and had been cleared to fly the ##### SID (Standard Instrument Departure). Unfortunately, we made the outbound turn earlier than the published DME distance for turn.

Before engine start the Captain (Pilot Flying) briefed the departure procedure; I don't remember exactly what was said but I remember thinking that he would fly it using green data on his EFIS display (e.g. VOR navigation selected rather than FMS) and I set my side to use white data (FMS navigation).

During taxi out, as I was completing the Before Take-off checks and auto tuning the radios, I realised that the Captain was using white data. At this point I probably should have asked for clarification from the Captain as to how he was going to fly the SID, but I thought that maybe I had mis-understood and switched to green data on my side to back up the white data on his side.

We completed the required checklists, received take-off clearance and departed. After departure the captain called for SPEED mode and HEADING mode, I selected these and realised that we had started a turn to the right. I thought that maybe the Heading bug was commanding a turn; I asked if he had meant NAVIGATION mode rather than HEADING mode and selected NAV mode. When he continued the turn I queried why we were turning before the published DME distance. At this point we were close to the published DME distance and the captain elected to continue the turn to the published outbound course.

Lessons Learned: I should not have assumed that the Captain meant to be in white data, asking him about it may have avoided this error. Also I should have been clearer in my communication that we were turning right of course.

CHIRP Comment: Although seemingly obvious, the purpose of the departure briefing is to ensure that the navigation aids and flight management systems are correctly set for the departure routing, that both pilots understand the departure procedure and, where relevant, the alternative procedure in the event of an emergency. As the reporter notes, if any doubt exists either during the briefing or the departure, seek a clarification immediately.

CHIRP Narrative: The following two reports were submitted by pilots of commercial/corporate helicopters:

(1) MILITARY AIRFIELDS - 'ACTUAL' VS REAL

Report Text: Whilst transiting in moderate snow from the North of England to London we asked for RAF ###'s weather as this was a planned fuel stop. They reported the Actual as being CAVOK. This Actual was reported from three sources, AAA (Nearby Regional Airport, London Info and RAF ###. Each time the report was CAVOK.

When 5nm north of RAF ### still in heavy snow we asked ATC to look out of the window and say what they could see. "Snow; O/cast 600ft" was the reply. This has occurred on numerous occasions at various RAF bases. They only produce a '50min past the hour 'Actual' which is read by ATC until the next is issued. When questioned the response is unhelpful and 'this is the way we do it!'

RAF station's met officers (civilians) provide a required service to aid the aviation industry in Met Safety Management, but the repetition of non-existent weather

defeats this objective. In fact it is worse than having 'no report' as it can lead to the wrong decision being made by aircrew (mine on the day).

Why can't they change the 'actual' as the weather changes significantly in line with all civilian airfields?

CHIRP Comment: The reporter's comments were passed to the MoD Aviation Regulation and Safety Group (MARSG) who advised that whereas civil airfields update weather information at +20 and +50 minutes past each hour, military airfields regularly update only at 50 minutes past each hour.

However, any change of military weather 'Colour State' will trigger a special bulletin and because many military operations require careful monitoring of weather any changes are notified immediately to the Distress and Diversion (D & D) Cell; changes are also subsequently notified to London ATCC but not to regional airports. The current weather colour state at any UK military airfield is available by contacting the D & D Cell.

The reason why the deterioration reported above did not trigger a special bulletin is not clear.

(2) STATUS OF PARACHUTING SITES

Report Text: Having checked the NOTAMs for our flight from ##### to a private site in Gloucester, there were none to affect.

When two-way R/T contact with Lyneham I was surprised to be informed that 'Redlands' parachuting site was active up to 10,000ft. We avoided the site without issue. On questioning the lack of NOTAM I was advised they do not issue one, but instead rely on Lyneham to broadcast activation. It struck me that had Lyneham ATC been extremely busy, or had an aircraft without a radio been in the vicinity an infringement could have occurred.

Why aren't parachuting DZs mandated to issue NOTAMs especially as their airspace is advisory in nature?

CHIRP Comment: Parachuting sites are marked on aeronautical charts; however the nature of their activities, which are sensitive to wind, cloud base and precipitation, requires a flexible means of notifying activity to permit other airspace users access to the airspace when not in parachuting use. The arrangement described in the report provides this flexibility.

It could be argued that the safe option would be to NOTAM sites as active and permit entry only on notification by RTF clearance that the site was not active; however, the counterargument is that such a system would not provide any incentive for the airspace to be released.

ATSOCAS - WHAT'S THAT?!

Report Text: Overheard on Scottish Regional Airport Approach Frequency from a UK operator inbound.

Pilot - "Request descent".

ATC - "That will take you outside Controlled Airspace".

Pilot - "That's OK".

ATC - "Deconfliction service".

Pilot - "What is that?"

ATC explains it - Pilot says he hasn't heard of it.

ATC say he should have had a CD. Pilot says, no he hasn't.

CHIRP Comment: The new Air Traffic Services outside Controlled Airspace (ATSOCAS) came into effect on 12 March 2009. If you did not receive a CD and are not aware of the changes, they are described in an interactive guide that is available at: <http://www.airspacesafety.com>

LEVEL 2 VARIATION - STANDBY

Report Text: An interesting roster pattern: Day one has an early standby, Day 2 has an early morning home standby for a Level 2 Variation duty and Day 3 is a standby.

Regarding Day 2, I can see that it is preferable to an airport standby but it has an 'early' standby start time to cover a Level 2 variation with a scheduled FDP of more than 13 ½ hrs. Not only do the figures not add up but CAP 371 (which is a minimum standard) and the Company FTL scheme require the day prior to and after a Level 2 operation to be days off. Neither the day before nor the day after is free from duty.

Most standbys are carried out from home (or with the mobile within reach) and I see no definition of a home standby which would cover the above case. Given that the legislation tells me that I "should not fly if I believe myself to be in breach of flight time limitations", exactly how am I within flight time limitations with this roster and how exactly am I supposed to operate a Level 2 variation on Day 2 without starting significantly more than one hour into discretion?

The Level 2 duty is tiring and long enough when it is rostered according to the normal rules. The Level 2 may be costly in manpower but that is a management choice which has to be balanced with fatigue management.

CHIRP Comment: The rostering principles described in this disidentified report were referred to the CAA and were subsequently the subject of discussions between the CAA and the operator concerned. The operator provided the following response:

Using the author's Day one, Day 2 scenario they are absolutely correct; the Level 2 flight cannot be flown if the standby on Day 1 remains. The Level 2 flight could only be operated if Days one and 3 were changed to days off. Clearly, standby duties are all about providing maximum flexibility, if the decision is made post roster publication to use the crewmember on the Level 2, or remain on standby for the Level 2 on Day 2, then the crewmember would need to be stood down from the standby duty on Day 1, and subsequently on Day 3. If not stood down the crew could not be used on the Level 2 on Day 2, but could of course be used for other duties that are not a Level 2, or the same duty if it can be operated within the normal FDP rules.

The second point the author makes is regarding the maximum FDP allowable after call out from standby. CAP 371 provides the following guidance (the company Operations Manual wording is almost identical):

Section B Para.12 - Standby Duty

Para 12.1 The time of start, end and nature of the standby duty must be defined and notified to crew members. The time a standby duty starts determines the allowable FDP, except that when the actual FDP starts in a more limiting time band then that FDP limit will apply. However, when standby is undertaken at home, or in suitable accommodation provided by the operator, during the period 2200 to 0800 hours local time and a crew member is given 2 hours or less notice of a report time, the allowable FDP starts at the report time for the designated reporting place.

Thus, if called from standby at 0630 for an 0800 report the crewmembers maximum FDP would be based on the 0800 report (13¼ hours plus one hour for the Level 2 variation. i.e. 14¼ hours) which would be sufficient for the scheduled FDP.

As this example shows, the arrangements for providing standby cover for a flight duty period conducted under a Level 2 Variation can be complex. Where a roster pattern may require duty changes post-publication such as those described above it would not be unreasonable for these to be clearly identified on the roster and/or promulgated in the Operations Manual.

WEB BASED TRAINING

Report Text: My airline has introduced a web based training program with individual modules. However, no duty time is being rostered for it.

If a pilot was to complete a module (1-4 hours depending on ability) before his duty starts, then fly a full duty period, surely he would be technically outside of the FTLs? This obviously would probably only come to light after an incident, when it would be too late.

CHIRP Comment: Where an operator introduces a web based self-study recurrent training programme that replaces formal classroom training and requires a significant period of time to complete, it would seem to be reasonable for the operator to allocate a period of duty time to the self-study task.

However, an individual's licence-holder responsibilities include ensuring that they are adequately prepared to undertake their assigned duties; this might require periods of self-study on an ad hoc basis as their other duties permit.

It is the responsibility of the operator and CAA (SRG) to determine which of the above options would be appropriate in each case. The reporter's comments on the training referenced in this report have been referred to the CAA.

FIT TO OPERATE?

Report Text: At duty report the senior cabin crew member (SCCM) appeared to be suffering from a bad cold and their fitness to operate was questioned. I was assured that the crew member felt fit and had no trouble clearing ears and sinuses. As the duty progressed the SCCM's fitness appeared to deteriorate but he/she was adamant that their fitness was robust.

Only when the aeroplane had dispatched on the final homeward bound sector did the SCCM admit to being unfit to operate but had been reluctant to report sick because they feared the resulting enquiry and possible

disciplinary action by company management. This type of occurrence is now happening frequently in this company. The draconian nature of the company cabin crew sickness policy is encouraging crew members to report for work when they are unfit to do so.

Clearly the health and safety of crew and passengers is being compromised. Also, I think undue pressure is being placed on Captains who, knowing how offloaded crew may be treated, feel obliged to consider crew careers as well as aircraft safety. Captains should be able to make safety decisions without carrying this burden.

Lessons Learned: The company cabin crew sickness policy, designed to discourage malingering, is heavy handed and is compromising flight safety. If certain individuals are guilty of illegitimate absenteeism then the company should direct its energy efficiently to catch the few instead of compromising the many.

CHIRP Comment: This is one of a number of reports received on the topic of cabin crew sickness and the alleged pressure placed on individuals to operate.

It is not unreasonable for an operator to monitor and manage absences from work due to sickness; regrettably, some individuals have been known to use 'sickness' as a method of controlling their roster pattern. However, crew welfare should be paramount and, in genuine cases, an individual has the right to expect that they will receive their company's support. If sickness is mismanaged it could result in an unintended consequence of safety being adversely affected if crewmembers felt compelled to report for duty knowing that they were unfit to fly.

Company policies for the management of sickness vary, but it is important that the policy is consistent and fair. In some cases HR managers are involved directly in the process but often line managers are responsible for conducting 'wellness'/return to work interviews. The manner in which such meetings are conducted is very important; where necessary operators might consider whether line managers have the appropriate interpersonal skills and/or training to conduct such interviews. A perceived lack of empathy on the part of a manager during such an interview can easily give rise to a perception that the meeting is a disciplinary hearing; this can lead to a widespread view among other crewmembers that the company is unwilling to accept genuine cases of sickness, which in turn can lead to individuals reporting for duty when knowingly unfit, with all the attendant consequences.

It remains every crew member's responsibility not to operate when unfit. It is imperative that cabin crew are able to react effectively, both physically and mentally, should unforeseen circumstances arise. If a crewmember, who is genuinely ill, feels that they have not been dealt with in an appropriate way they should raise the matter at the earliest opportunity with their company's occupational health service.

RE "ADDITIONAL CREW REST - WHY?" (FB90)

A number of flight crew members commented on the publication of the cabin crew report "Additional Crew Rest - Why?" in the last issue. Several were critical of

the decision to publish the report at all, others criticised the use of the term "In Charge" and also the absence of a detailed explanation of the reason for flight crew electing to take Controlled Rest. The following are typical of the views expressed:

(1)

Report Text: I was very annoyed reading "Additional Crew Rest - Why?" in issue 90 recently. The author has ideas and self appointed authority above their station. Sometimes, as 'heavy' crew, fatigue does not allow sleep at the ideal time, it is not acceptable/professional for cabin crew to be "disappointed" about flight crew using controlled rest or to "question their intentions" regarding rest.

The use of the words "sub culture" implies that the author thinks that using controlled rest on this type of flight is an inappropriate/lazy/unauthorised procedure. I'm glad that the CHIRP reply explained that controlled rest in this scenario is perfectly acceptable.

The author's intent to "confirm the exact intentions of the pilots for their rest before take off" illustrates a lack of understanding of this issue and a lack of respect for the flight crew and the rank structure on the aircraft.

I think it would have been better if CHIRP had produced a more comprehensive/robust reply on this issue, or better still, not printed the ramblings of someone who clearly does not understand the issue and their responsibilities as crew.

(2)

Report Text: I would like to refer you to the Spring 2009 edition pages 11 and 12.

I would be interested to hear if anyone else thought that perhaps the roots to the reporter's problems may lie within their reports:

I counted the use of 'Flight Deck' at least 6 times within the two reports. There can sometimes be up to four occupants on the flight deck and I find this title for a member or members of the flight crew inappropriate. It is incredible how many different characters and personalities we have as pilots, we are all very different and that makes our job interesting and fun - I find the same applies with cabin crew. There can sometimes be 16 crew in the cabin and I do not think I have ever heard the use of 'cabin deck' or similar - it is always cabin crew, they are treated as individuals.

I am also amazed to see the use of the word 'In-Charge' so often - surely the 'In-Charge' would be the Captain? Yes whoever is leading the cabin crew operation must have a title but I find it worrying that the cabin crew would assume that the In-Charge is someone other than the Captain. Perhaps this is why "All the crew were reluctant to raise the matter directly with the Captain"! I also quote "CRM is extremely important when an incident like this occurs" - Surely CRM is always important whether we are in an incident or not?

One reporter seems to question the breaks taken by the flight crew 'It was disappointing that the pilots had decided to have a second break'. I do not know the details but flight crew have a completely different job

on board and lead completely different roster patterns to cabin crew and if the Captain found it necessary for himself or any of his crew (including the cabin crew) to have extra rest in order for the safe completion of the flight then he has the authority to allow this.

Communication seems to have been a problem in these reports and I cannot comment on this - perhaps the reason was a breakdown in CRM partly caused by the issues above. I know that the senior cabin crew member has a duty to organise a lot of people in a difficult environment and I often do not envy their role but I feel that with so many crew on board an aircraft we must be in no doubt who the 'In-Charge' is.

CHIRP Comment: All cabin crew reports published in FEEDBACK are reviewed by both the Cabin Crew Advisory Board and the Air Transport Advisory Board. Both Boards recommended publication of the report in question in FEEDBACK to raise awareness among flight crew of the lack of understanding among many cabin crew members of the rationale for Controlled Rest and to highlight the need for the senior cabin crew member to be briefed on the alerting procedure, particularly if this varied from the SOP.

A more detailed explanation of Controlled Rest was not included, as flight crew members using it will be aware of the rationale for its use. The report is to be published in the CABIN CREW version of FEEDBACK; this will include a more detailed explanation of Controlled Rest, its benefits and why it is necessary.

Finally, the frequent use of the term 'In Charge' in cabin crew reports published in FEEDBACK was criticised; this was the fault of the editor not cabin crew reporters. In order to disidentify CC reports it was necessary to find a generic descriptor to replace the specific titles used by individual operators. In view of the comments, we have elected to use the term 'senior cabin crew member (SCCM)' in future reports. Similarly we will edit the term 'flight deck', when used for flight crew members.

CONTROLLED REST - ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Report Text: I wish to write about something which concerns me greatly. Almost every Captain I fly with implements a system of "Controlled Rest" on night sectors..... and also sometimes on day sectors. The night sectors worry me most as it is difficult to stay awake on a dimly lit flight deck. During the period of "Controlled Rest" which can extend for most of the flight, the Cabin Crew are requested not to ring the Flight Deck routinely as per our normal Standard Operating Procedure but instead whoever is awake and in control on the flight deck will ring out in the cabin every 30 minutes.

It is great to have the opportunity to gain some rest, especially if operating without a heavy flight crew member, but increasingly I feel worried about the consequences of falling asleep without even realising it and the dire situation that could occur as a result.

Please could we have some guidance on this matter? It is happening across the board and needs to be addressed rather urgently I feel.

I have the greatest respect for my colleagues but find it is difficult to address this issue directly when flying and thus require your assistance.

CHIRP Comment: It was apparent from several of the comments on Controlled Rest that there might be a lack of understanding about the relative benefits of in-flight napping and the effect of short periods of sleep on alertness/ performance. Some UK operators provide specific guidance on the subject and, where this is available, it should be complied with. The following is a reminder of one of the principal recommendations from the CAA Paper 2003/8 - 'A Review of In-Flight Napping Strategies':

4.1 Because of the effects of sleep inertia, non-augmented crews who may need to operate at short notice in-flight should not rely on napping to maintain acceptable levels of alertness. Short naps on the flight deck of no more than 30 minutes should only be used to combat unexpectedly low levels of alertness that could not have been anticipated when the flight was scheduled. (This might also be relevant to the operating crew members of an augmented crew, during the period where one crew member is taking bunk/cabin rest). If a single 30-minute nap is insufficient to raise alertness to an acceptable level, the use of further 30-minute naps should be considered, although further studies are required to establish the efficacy of this strategy.

The Paper also recommends a recovery period of 20 minutes after a 30-minute sleep; the recovery period from a longer period of sleep may be significantly greater. The Paper is available on the CAA website.

CAA (SRG) FODCOMS

The following CAA (SRG) FODCOMS have been issued since 16 April 2009

11/2009

Demonstration of Compliance with the Requirements of the Air Navigation Order 2005 (Schedules 4 and 5), EU-OPS and JAR-OPS 3 (Sub-parts K and L) and JAR-26

12/2009

Operations Manual Requirements for the British Formula 1 Grand Prix Event at Silverstone on 21 June 2009

13/2009

Minimum Equipment List - Rectification Interval Extensions

14/2009

Operations to Elevated Helipads - Training and Recency

15/2009

Check Flights Carried Out by Operators

16/2009

Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Arrival (STAR) Climb and Descent Procedures and Phraseology

17/2009

CAA Olympic and Paralympic Games Steering Group (COPSG)

18/2009

Supplementary Restraint for Persons of Reduced Mobility

19/2009

Calculation of Take-off Performance - Line-up Allowance

20/2009

Variable Maximum Take-off Weight

CAA (SRG) Flight Operations Department Communications are published on the CAA website - www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

If you wish to contact the CAA Flight Operations Inspectorate or to report any safety matter which is outside the scope of the MOR Scheme please e-mail the CAA at:

flightoperationsafety@caa.co.uk

CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS?

If you receive FEEDBACK as a licensed pilot/ATCO/maintenance engineer please notify Personnel Licensing at the CAA of your change of address and not CHIRP. Please complete a change of address form which is available to download from the CAA website and fax/post to:

Civil Aviation Authority
Personnel Licensing Department
Licensing Operations
Aviation House
Gatwick Airport South
West Sussex RH6 0YR
Fax: 01293 573996

The Change of address form is available from: www.caa.co.uk/docs/175/srg_fcl_changeofaddress.pdf

Alternatively, you can e-mail your change of address to the following relevant department (please remember to include your licence number):

Flight Crew..... fclweb@caa.co.uk
ATCO/FISO..... ats.licensing@caa.co.uk
Maintenance Engineer eldweb@caa.co.uk

CONTACT US

CHIRP
FREEPOST (G13439) [no stamp required]
Building Y20E, Room G15
Cody Technology Park
Ively Road
Farnborough GU14 0BR, UK

Freefone (UK only): 0800 214645 or
Telephone: +44 (0) 1252 395013
Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290 (secure)
E-mail: confidential@chirp.co.uk

Registered in England No: 3253764

Registered Charity: 1058262

CHIRP

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company

Name: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. 2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT 3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.
Address: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/>	
Post Code: <input style="width: 30%;" type="text"/> Tel: <input style="width: 60%;" type="text"/>	
e-mail: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/> ▲ Indicates Mandatory Fields	

It is CHIRP policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:	No. I do not require a response from CHIRP <input style="width: 30px; height: 20px;" type="checkbox"/>
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PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF		THE EVENT/SITUATION			
TOTAL EXPERIENCE	YRS	DATE		WEATHER:	
EXPERIENCE PRESENT UNIT	YRS	LOCAL TIME		VMC	<input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/>
VALIDATED PRESENT POSITION	YRS	LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT		RAIN	<input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/>
ACTING AS INSTRUCTOR	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEAREST REPORTING POINT		ICE	<input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/>
UNDER TRAINING	<input type="checkbox"/>	DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>		OTHER:	
UNIT/SERVICE		FLIGHT PHASE		1ST AIRCRAFT	2ND AIRCRAFT
NATS <input type="checkbox"/> NON- NATS <input type="checkbox"/>		TAXI <input type="checkbox"/> TAKE-OFF <input type="checkbox"/>		TYPE/SERIES	TYPE/SERIES
ATC SERVICE(S) BEING PROVIDED		CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/> CRUISE <input type="checkbox"/>		OPERATOR	OPERATOR
TYPE(S) OF AIRSPACE		DESCENT <input type="checkbox"/> APPROACH <input type="checkbox"/>		PAX <input type="checkbox"/> FREIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>	PAX <input type="checkbox"/> FREIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>
TYPE OF RADAR		LANDING <input type="checkbox"/> GO AROUND <input type="checkbox"/>		OTHER:	OTHER:
SHIFT WORKED		OTHER:		IFR <input type="checkbox"/> VFR <input type="checkbox"/>	IFR <input type="checkbox"/> VFR <input type="checkbox"/>
HOURS ON DUTY	HRS			OTHER:	OTHER:
LOCATION		My MAIN POINTS ARE:			
NAME OF UNIT/AIRFIELD:		A:			
REPORT TOPIC		B:			
MY REPORT RELATES TO:		C:			

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training • Sleep Patterns

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary

PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:
CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK
 Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290
 Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk

CHIRP

ENGINEER REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company/Airline

Name:

Address:

Post Code: Tel:

e-mail: **Indicates Mandatory Fields**

1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.
2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.
NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT
3. **CHIRP** is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.

It is **CHIRP** policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:

No. I do not require a response from **CHIRP**

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF		THE EVENT		DOCUMENTARY	
CERTIFYING ENGINEER	<input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		PROCEDURES	<input type="checkbox"/>
TECHNICAL SUPPORT	<input type="checkbox"/>	TIME OF OCCURRENCE	AM/PM	MANUALS	<input type="checkbox"/>
QUALITY	<input type="checkbox"/>			DOCUMENTATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
MECHANIC	<input type="checkbox"/>			REGULATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXPERTISE		THE AIRCRAFT		HARDWARE	
A&C	<input type="checkbox"/>	AIRCRAFT/ENGINE TYPE		MATERIALS	<input type="checkbox"/>
AVIONICS	<input type="checkbox"/>	SYSTEM/COMPONENT		SPARES	<input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER:				TOOLS	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXPERIENCE		AIRCRAFT REG	G-	EXTERNAL	
YEARS IN MAINTENANCE IND	YRS	REPORTED TO		COMMUNICATIONS	<input type="checkbox"/>
YEARS AT PRESENT COMPANY	YRS	LINE MANAGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	WEATHER	<input type="checkbox"/>
		QUALITY	<input type="checkbox"/>	TIME PRESSURE	<input type="checkbox"/>
		TECH SUPPORT	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER:	
		CAA - MOR	<input type="checkbox"/>	ITEMS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN EVENT (TICK ALL THAT APPLY)	
		OTHER:		INSPECTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
		FACTORS		FAULT ISOLATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
SHIFT WORKED		MANPOWER LEVELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	TESTING	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOURS ON DUTY PRIOR TO INCIDENT	HRS	SKILLS	<input type="checkbox"/>	INSTALLATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
		TRAINING	<input type="checkbox"/>	REPAIR	<input type="checkbox"/>
		MEDICAL STATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHEDULED MAIN	<input type="checkbox"/>
				LOGBOOK ENTRY	<input type="checkbox"/>
				MEL	<input type="checkbox"/>
THE COMPANY		My MAIN POINTS ARE:			
NAME OF COMPANY:		A:			
REPORT TOPIC		B:			
MY REPORT RELATES TO:		C:			

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

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CHIRP

PILOT/FLIGHT CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company/Airline

Name: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/> Address: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/> Post Code: <input style="width: 20%;" type="text"/> Tel: <input style="width: 30%;" type="text"/> e-mail: <input style="width: 60%;" type="text"/> ▲ Indicates Mandatory Fields	1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. 2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT 3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.
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It is CHIRP policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:	No. I do not require a response from CHIRP <input type="checkbox"/>
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PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION				THE FLIGHT/EVENT			
CAPTAIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		TIME	(LOCAL/GMT)
PILOT FLYING	<input type="checkbox"/>	PILOT NOT FLYING	<input type="checkbox"/>	LOCATION		HEIGHT/ALT/FL	
FLIGHT ENGINEER	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER CREW MEMBER	<input type="checkbox"/>	TYPE OF ATC SERVICE		DAY	<input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>
THE AIRCRAFT		TYPE OF FLIGHT		TYPE OF OPERATION			
TYPE/SERIES		IFR	<input type="checkbox"/> VFR <input type="checkbox"/>	PASSENGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	TRAINING	<input type="checkbox"/>
NUMBER OF CREW		OTHER:	<input type="checkbox"/>	FREIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER:	
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION		WEATHER		FLIGHT PHASE			
TOTAL HOURS	Hrs	VMC	<input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/>	TAXI	<input type="checkbox"/>	TAKE-OFF	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOURS ON TYPE	Hrs	RAIN	<input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/>	CLIMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	CRUISE	<input type="checkbox"/>
TRG CAPT <input type="checkbox"/>	TRE <input type="checkbox"/>	ICE	<input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/>	DESCENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROACH	<input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:		OTHER:		LANDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO AROUND	<input type="checkbox"/>
THE COMPANY				MY MAIN POINTS ARE:			
NAME OF COMPANY:				A:			
REPORT TOPIC				B:			
MY REPORT RELATES TO:				C:			

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

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